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 ABSTRACT 
The aim of the current research is to understand how different perspectives in a 
violent event can affect empathy, violence sensitivity, and word usage. Participants 
(N=289 University of Rhode Island undergraduate students) were randomly assigned 
to the perspective (victim, bystander, and perpetrator) and media by which they 
learned about a violent event (watching a video or reading a news article), and were 
asked to answer a few open-ended questions about the event, followed by a short 
survey. Results showed that for the words in the categories of negative emotion, anger, 
first person pronoun, and affective process, participants assigned to the perpetrator and 
victim perspectives used the words at a similar rate, and participants in the bystander 
perspective used the words of these categories less. Participants who watched the 
video used more words in the personal pronoun (first, second, and third person 
pronoun), first person pronoun (e.g., I, me), and negative emotion categories. Results 
did not show differences between the groups for the subscales of empathy, and for the 
categories of violence sensitivity. Separate ANCOVAS suggested group differences 
based on perspective in violence severity for physical violent behaviors, and group 
differences based on media in violence severity for nonphysical violent behaviors. 
There were also main effects for perspective and media on violence sensitivity total. 
Participants assigned to the bystander perspective who watched the video clip were 
less violence sensitive. Finally, there was a significant correlation between empathy 
total and violence sensitivity total. Overall, results suggest that bystanders perceive 
events differently than perpetrators and victims, and participants who read are more 
 violence sensitive and empathetic. The results of this study could be applied in the 
development of bystander intervention and violence prevention programs.
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CHAPTER 1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 Much of the recent news is about violence and different forms of violence: 
mass shootings, terrorist attacks, domestic and sexual violence, bullying and cyber-
bullying, and the list continues. Some of the violence might even be socially 
acceptable such as what is seen in different sports, including boxing, hockey, football, 
or rugby. Some of these news stories affect and captivate our attention more than 
others. A possible reason for why some news affects us strongly is that someone we 
know or ourselves is being directly affected by this type of violence. The way people 
can be involved and affected by a violent event can vary. A person can be the 
perpetrator, that is, the person inflicting harm on purpose, the victim, the person who 
is being harmed, or the bystander, a person who is witnessing harm being done to 
someone else. 
Each of these roles in a conflict has a unique perspective, which may be 
influenced in a variety of ways. How people interpret an act of violence, how sensitive 
they are, how likely they are to intervene, whether they condemn the behavior, and 
how they would react if they were ever in a similar position may depend on their roles 
in the conflict and how it affects them in the moment. 
This particular research study aims to determine how different views of a same 
violent event can vary depending on the perspective a person has on the event, as well 
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as how the person learns about the event. Of interest are not only how differently the 
perspectives perceive the violence, but also the variations in violence sensitivity, 
empathy, and the words used to retell the story that may be characteristic of each 
perspective. 
Victims, Perpetrators and their differing perspectives 
As you listen to the stories of people retelling a conflict, one of the things that 
might be noticed is that stories of the same event can vary from person to person. The 
story can vary depending on the role a person played, that is, whether he or she was 
the victim, the perpetrator or the bystander. There are several ways a story may vary. 
Baumeister and colleagues have done research in order to determine the differences in 
perspectives of the victim and perpetrator roles. In his book Evil, Baumeister (1996) 
uses the term magnitude gap to refer to “the discrepancy between the importance of 
the act to the perpetrator and to the victim” (p. 18). In other words, the victim might 
feel the event is really important in the way that it has affected him or her, whereas the 
perpetrator might underestimate its importance. 
In the study by Baumeister, Stillwell, and Wotman (1990), the researchers 
asked participants to write two autobiographical stories, one about when they were in 
the position of the victim, and another story where they were in the position of the 
perpetrator. Results suggested that participants interpreted the events differently based 
on the perspective from which they were retelling the story. One difference between 
the two perspectives was in the way participants described or referred to the time 
frame of the event. Victims provided a background to the story (Baumeister, Stillwell, 
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& Wotman, 1990); not only did they look at the past and possible consequences of the 
events, but also mentioned the consequences of the event, and the impact on the 
present. Thus, victims have a more comprehensive outlook; they look at the past, 
present and future. For the victims, the consequences of the event stay with them 
longer, so the time span used to describe the event is longer (Baumeister, 1996). As 
for emotions, victims can also feel anger for a longer period of time (Baumeister, 
Stillwell, & Wotman, 1990). 
In contrast, perpetrators saw the situation as a closed event; it had a beginning 
and it had an end or closure. Participants retelling a story from a perpetrator 
perspective did not provide a background story to the event, and were less likely to 
provide accounts of the consequences (in contrast to those in a victim position). The 
authors suggested that victims recall a series of events before they express anger 
toward the perpetrator; however, the perpetrators do not see it the same way. Rather, 
perpetrators only recall the event when the victim draws his or her attention to it, and 
might think that the victims are over-reacting (Baumeister, Stillwell, & Wotman, 
1990).  
The magnitude gap, according to Baumeister (1996) also “involves intangible 
factors such as the victim’s suffering compared to the perpetrator’s pleasure” (p. 110). 
Baumeister refers to the consequences of an event, as these are usually bigger and 
more negative for the victims than for the perpetrator. If the event is considered in 
terms of who gains and loses the most, victims are the ones that will lose the most, 
while the gain of perpetrators would be minimal. Because the loss of victims is 
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greater, it will affect them more, and might make them continually think about the 
losses and consequences; this could be considered as a continuation of the event 
(Baumeister, Stillwell, & Wotman, 1990). The consequences are a continuous 
reminder of what happened, making it difficult to forget the event. The perpetrator, 
however, whose loss is smaller, is able to put an end to the event and does not 
generally continue to think about the consequences. He or she will also tend to 
minimize the consequences, limiting rather than extending the psychological duration 
of the “event” itself (Baumeister, Stillwell, & Wotman, 1990). Thus the time frame of 
the event for the perpetrator is shorter than it is for the victim. 
Another difference between victims and perpetrators is in the way they 
understand why the event happened. The victims perceive the action as something 
unexpected that did not have any reason for happening (Baumeister, 1996.) However, 
perpetrators do not think the same way, they believe there is a reason for the action. 
Perpetrators do not believe it was random, though they can acknowledge that it might 
have been impulsive (Baumeister, Stillwell, & Wotman, 1990). They are also likely to 
place the blame on external causes, including the victim; this eases their sense of guilt. 
Perpetrators of intentional violence often believe that their actions were just, and that 
the victim deserved what happened to him or her. 
Stillwell and Baumeister (1997) researched the differences in perspective 
between victims and perpetrators. In this study the authors asked participants to retell 
a story from the perspective of the victim or the perpetrator. Results showed that 
perpetrators emphasized details that would make them look better and avoided details 
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that would made them look bad, even if the details were relevant. However, victims 
were more likely to change a story to enhance their suffering, and would make the 
perpetrator look more responsible for the event. Both roles changed the stories for the 
storyteller’s own benefit. Perpetrators would change the story in a way that would 
reduce the blame, including the suffering of the victim, and the victim would avoid 
mentioning possible justifications for the perpetrator’s behavior, and any other 
positive information about the perpetrator. 
Jones and Nisbett (1972) also discuss the differences between different 
perspectives, but in terms of observers (bystanders), and actors (perpetrators). The 
authors discussed how these two perspectives explain the same event or information 
differently. Jones and Nisbett suggest the actor is unlikely to focus attention onto him 
or herself, and instead focuses his or her attention on the circumstances. However, the 
observer tends to focus more on the actors and their personal characteristics than the 
circumstances of the event. As Jones and Nisbett stated “there is a pervasive tendency 
for actors to attribute their actions to the situational requirements, whereas observers 
tend to attribute the same actions to stable personal dispositions” (p. 80.) This helps 
explain how a person makes dispositional attributions for someone else’s actions when 
the actions affect him or her, possibly ignoring the situation the person was in. Or vice 
versa, the actor might only make situational attributions to avoid the responsibility for 
his or her actions, and ignore dispositional attributions. 
The reasons behind the actions, whether it is a person’s own actions or 
someone else’s, are understood and expressed by attributions. Attribution, according 
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to Fisk and Taylor (2013), “fundamentally concerns how people infer causal 
explanations for other people’s actions and mental states” (p. 149.) According to 
Heider (1958) there are two main categories of understanding why a person acts a 
certain way. A person can place the responsibility of a behavior on the person 
(dispositional attributions), outside of the person (situational attributions), or a 
combination of both. Dispositional attributions focus on stable personality 
characteristics (within the person). Situational attributions focus on the situation and 
specific circumstances (outside the person). Thus, someone’s behaviors can be 
explained by his personality, at other times the person’s behavior is attributed to the 
circumstances, and at other times to a combination of both. 
Cognitive Dissonance 
 As individuals retell the story of what happened - regardless of the perspective 
- they might still be in the process of understanding the event and the reasons why it 
happened. As they do this, they can experience cognitive dissonance. Cognitive 
dissonance refers to the psychological discomfort people feel when they are unable to 
easily reconcile their beliefs and actions (Festinger, 1957.) In response to cognitive 
dissonance, the person adjusts his or her attitude and appraisals toward greater comfort 
in their interpretation of events to be consistent with the observed behaviors. 
 Both perpetrators and victims can experience cognitive dissonance. 
Perpetrators might try to rationalize their actions, or change their attitudes, since they 
cannot deny or undo their behaviors. To do this, people can place less importance on 
the event than it actually deserves, as suggested by Baumeister, Stillwell, and Wotman 
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(1990). Perpetrators can also assume less responsibility and place the blame on other 
people, including the victim. This way, perpetrators can reduce the psychological 
discomfort of cognitive dissonance. Besides placing the blame on the victim, 
perpetrators are likely to blame the circumstances, thus avoiding responsibility for 
their actions.  
Victims can also experience cognitive dissonance. It might be difficult for 
them to comprehend and make sense of why they are in a situation where they are 
experiencing suffering or injustice. It might be difficult for them to understand and 
come to terms with the reasons that lead another person, whether it is a stranger or not, 
to hurt them. This might be especially true if the victims have a belief in a just world 
(BJW). People who believe in a just world, believe that if they do good, good things 
will be reciprocated, and good will come back to them, rather than bad things such as 
suffering (Lerner & Miller, 1978). Based on the BJW, people believe that those who 
suffer are the ones that have harmed others or have done bad things to others. If 
victims have not acted in an unjust way towards another person, they might experience 
cognitive dissonance. Research by Dalbert (1999) suggests it is important to 
differentiate between personal BJW and general BJW. Dalbert suggests that personal 
BJW explains good well-being and healthy self-esteem. For people who believe in a 
just world and have behaved unjustly, their self-esteem is affected in a negative way. 
For people who believe in a just world, out of good actions come good things, 
including a positive view of the self, and self-worth. If perpetrators have a BJW and 
act in an unjust way towards others or in a way that is contradictory to their views, 
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then they could experience guilt and shame; thus their self-worth might be affected in 
a negative way. If perpetrators experience these negative effects, then they might try to 
reduce the discomfort caused by cognitive dissonance.  
Bystanders 
So far the discussion has emphasized the variations in the perspective of 
victims and perpetrators, but little has been said about the bystander perspective. A 
bystander is a person who witnesses an event and can choose to intervene or not. In 
order for the bystander to intervene in a situation, Latané & Darley (1968) suggest that 
three things need to happen: “the bystander needs to notice the event and interpret it as 
an emergency, and he must decide that it is his personal responsibility to act” (p. 220.) 
If one of these three things does not happen, the bystander will not intervene and will 
remain a passive bystander. 
There is an exhaustive body of research regarding the likelihood of bystanders 
to intervene in the event of a conflict (see Darley & Latané, 1968; Latané & Darley, 
1968; Darley, Teger, & Lewis, 1973). Previous research has aimed to understand why 
a bystander does not interfere in a conflict. One of the reasons has been termed the 
diffusion of responsibility (Latané & Darley, 1968) and it refers to the individual’s 
sense of personal responsibility based on how many people he or she knows that are 
aware of the situation. If there are many people around them, bystanders do not feel 
obligated or fully responsible to intervene because they shift some responsibility to the 
other people that are also present or know about the situation. However, if a bystander 
believes they are the only one present and aware of the emergency situation, then they 
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are more likely to respond (Darley & Latané, 1968; Latané & Darley, 1968). Thus, the 
more bystanders witnessing a situation, the less likely a bystander is to intervene and 
an intervention will be delayed.  
Another reason bystanders might not intervene in a situation is because of 
pluralistic ignorance (Darley, Teger, & Lewis, 1973; Latané & Darley, 1968). This 
could happen based on the number of people a bystander knows are aware of the 
situation. A person might think that if no other bystander interferes, that must mean 
the event must not be serious and the situation is not perceived as an emergency 
because no one else is interfering or doing anything to stop what is happening (Latané 
& Darley, 1968). 
Not only does the perception of a bystander in regard to a specific 
circumstance vary per individual and the circumstance for the bystander to decide 
whether to intervene, but the perception of a bystander can also vary with respect to 
the reasons such an event might have happened. The bystander tends to understand the 
actions of the perpetrator by emphasizing his or her personality characteristics (i.e. the 
bystander makes dispositional attributions), and underestimates the impact of 
circumstances (situational attributions) (Jones & Nisbett, 1972). Bystanders not only 
try to understand reasons for the perpetrator to act a certain way, but they will try to 
understand if the victim deserved such a bad thing to happen to them or not. Victim 
blaming is not uncommon, especially in sexual violence situations, where a person 
tries to understand such an event based on already accepted rape myths, or the 
characteristics of a victim, including gender, sexuality, the relationship between victim 
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and perpetrators, etc. (van der Bruggen & Grubb, 2014).  
 In the book Getting at Peace (1999), William Ury refers to bystanders as 
‘thirdsiders.’ He believes that as thirdsiders people can have an influence in the 
prevention, resolution and containment of violence. As he sees it, “the third side is 
people – from the community - using a certain kind of power – the power of peers – 
from a certain perspective - of common ground – supporting a certain process - of 
dialogue and nonviolence – and aiming for a certain product – a “triple win” (p. 14.) 
The goal of the thirdsider is to help people who are in conflict resolve differences with 
dialogue and avoiding violence (Ury, 1999.) 
In order to prevent violence, Ury believes thirdsiders have three roles: 
providers, teachers, and bridge-builders. The role of the provider is to help prevent 
violence and conflict when the needs of a person are not being met. Ury suggests there 
are four needs that have to be met in a person: food, safety, identity and freedom. He 
suggests that the role of the provider is to make sure these needs are met. The role of a 
teacher is to help prevent conflict by teaching others the necessary skills to help them 
avoid conflict: “By helping people learn new values, perspectives and skills, we can 
show them a better way to deal with differences” (p. 125.) There are three main things 
Ury feels need to be taught: (1) that violence does not solve problems (2) the 
importance of tolerance, not to agree but to respect “the essential humanity in every 
person” (p. 127) and (3) skills for problem solving. The final role to prevent violence 
is the bridge-builder. A way of being a bridge builder is by encouraging dialogue that 
will help increase the understanding of the perspective of another person, and increase 
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the trust among conflicting parties as well. The purpose of the prevention role is to 
reduce already existing conflict, and avoid it becoming an overt conflict. 
To resolve violence, thirdsiders can have the roles of mediator, arbiter, 
equalizer, and healer. As Ury clearly describes it, mediators “can help reconcile the 
parties’ interest. As Arbiters, we can determine rights. As Equalizers, we can help 
balance the power between the parties. And as Healers, we can help repair injured 
relationships” (p. 142.) In trying to reconcile the parties, the mediator tries to get to the 
root of the problem establishing good communication between the parties, and solve it 
by meeting the needs of both parties, ignoring whether someone is at fault. The end 
goal of a mediator is to help the parties reach an agreement where they are satisfied. 
The role of an Arbiter can be used when mediations fails. An Arbiter can help 
decide on a solution. Ury also suggests that this role could help “repair the harm to 
victims and to the community, and to reintegrate the offender as a constructive 
member of society” (p. 150.) The role of the Equalizer can help restore the power 
balance that might result in injustice. Finally, the role of the Healer can help to finally 
resolve a conflict and prevent it from reoccurring. 
Finally to contain violence thirdsiders may play the potential role of witness, 
referee and peacekeeper. Ury explains that once a situation escalates, the challenge for 
the third side is to “contain the power struggle so that the parties may be brought back 
to the negotiation table.” (p. 169.) Ury explains the escalation of an event based on the 
Chinese philosopher Mo Tzu, in that violence escalates into overt behavior when “no 
one is paying attention to the conflict or, even if someone is, because no one sets 
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limits on the fighting, or, lastly, because no one intervenes to provide protection.” (p. 
170.) A witness can be aware of early signs that something might get out of control, 
but can also call for help if needed. The referee can help by setting fair rules if there is 
a fight already. And finally, the peacekeeper can help make sure that peace ensues, 
and avoid violence before it starts. 
As suggested by Ury, thirdsiders (or bystanders) have many different ways to 
act constructively. Ury believes people can play a variety of active roles, and there are 
many things they can do. Often people may see overt situations of violence, so the 
only thing to do is to contain such violence. Other times, as with our friends, family, 
and co-workers people can sense some of the tension brewing, and it would be 
possible to prevent such tension from escalating and becoming overt. In many 
situations, there is something that could be done to reduce and avoid conflict and 
people as thirdsiders have that power. 
Human Aggression 
Aggression has been defined as the “behavior directed toward another 
individual that is carried out with the proximate (immediate) intent to cause harm” 
(Anderson & Bushman, 2002, p. 28.) It has been emphasized that in order for a 
behavior to be considered aggression the action of the perpetrator has to have as a goal 
harming the other person, and for the person who the behavior is aimed towards, to 
want to avoid it (Anderson & Bushman, 2002; Bushman & Anderson, 2001). There 
are also different forms by which people can express aggression such as physical, 
verbal or relational ways (Bushman & Bartholow, 2009). All of these forms include 
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the desire to harm another person. Physical aggression includes harming others “with 
body parts or weapons,” and verbal aggression includes harming others with words 
(Bushman & Bartholow, 2009.) Relational aggression is somewhat different, the harm 
is done is by negatively changing the relationship with others (e.g. Crick & Grotpeter, 
1995.) 
Aggression has been dichotomized by its function between hostile aggression 
and instrumental aggression. Hostile aggression (or reactive aggression) is mostly 
“impulsive, thoughtless, driven by anger… and occurring as a reaction of a 
provocation” (Anderson & Bushman, 2002, p. 29.) Instrumental aggression (or 
proactive aggression), refers to aggression that has been “premeditated [as a] means of 
obtaining some goal other than harming the victim, and being proactive rather than 
being reactive” (Anderson & Bushman, 2002, p. 29.) However, Bushman and 
Anderson (2001) disagree with the dichotomy between hostile and instrumental 
aggression, and suggest instead that there are two major problems with this 
dichotomy. One of the problems is that hostile and instrumental aggressions are not 
mutually exclusive; some of the motives of aggression can include both hostile and 
instrumental aggression. 
Another important dichotomy in aggression is the situational vs. 
personological causes of aggression (Anderson & Bushman, 2002; Anderson & 
Huesmann, 2003.) Situational versus personal (dispositional) attributions have been 
previously mentioned in this discussion, as ways by which bystanders try to 
understand the aggressive behaviors of others. It is important to note that the 
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situational and personological dichotomy can help explain why people act in 
aggressive ways. Anderson and Huesmann (2003) suggest that personological causes 
include “attitude, beliefs, and behavioral tendencies” (p. 299.) Situational causes 
however, are specific for every particular situation, and these situational causes can 
increase or decrease aggression. These factors might include “insult[s], uncomfortable 
temperatures, presence of a weapon, or presence of one’s religious leader…” (p. 299.) 
Behaviors result from the combination of personological and situational factors; 
whereas situational factors can increase or decrease aggressive behaviors, 
personological factors include the readiness of a person to aggress. When these two 
combine it can inhibit or increase aggressive behaviors (Anderson & Huesmann, 
2003.) 
 Over the years researchers have developed several theories of aggression, 
including Cognitive Neoassociation Theory, Social Learning Theory, Script Theory, 
Excitation Transfer Theory, Social Interaction Theory, Frustration-Aggression Theory, 
etc. Anderson and colleagues (e.g. Anderson & Bushman, 2002) integrated several of 
these theories and developed a framework called the General Aggression Model 
(GAM). One of the key features of the GAM is what is labeled as inputs, or what 
influences and causes aggressive behaviors. Inputs are divided into two categories, 
person factors (traits, sex, beliefs, attitudes, values, long-term goals, and scripts) and 
situational factors (aggressive cues, provocation, frustrations, pain and discomfort, 
drugs, and incentives). As Anderson and Bushman (2002) mention the “input variables 
influence the final outcome through the present internal state that they create” (p. 38.) 
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The internal states consist of cognition (hostile thoughts, scripts), affect (mood and 
emotion, and expressive motor responses), and arousal. These internal states function 
as filters that influence the outcomes of an event.  
Anderson and Bushman (2002) also explain that outcomes, including both 
thoughtful actions and impulsive actions have an influence “as part of the input” on 
future events. Impulsive actions (these actions may or may not be aggressive in 
nature) may occur when a person does not have the appropriate resources such as time 
and cognitive capacity to understand a situation. With the appropriate resources a 
person can reappraise the situation, and act in a thoughtful way (thoughtful action), 
that can be aggressive or not.  
Violence Sensitivity 
 As an actor or observer, when a person learns of an aggressive behavior, he or 
she can interpret its severity differently than another person, whether they are in a 
similar position or not. Violence sensitivity is a measure of the perceived severity of 
violent behavior. Using Likert ratings of the severity of many behaviors (e.g. murder, 
stabbing, bullying) two scales can be derived. One is a scale of severity, ranging 
approximately from murder to gossip. Principal factor analyses has suggested four 
categories within this range: V1 – more severe physical violence, V2 – less severe 
physical, V3 – more severe nonphysical, V4 – less severe nonphysical (Collyer, Gallo, 
Corey, Waters, & Boney-McCoy, 2007). The second scale is violence sensitivity, 
which measures individual differences in responsiveness to violence. Cluster analysis 
has suggested violence-sensitive (VS) and violence tolerant (VT) groups as a way to 
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describe these differences, but it is more realistic to think of sensitivity as a 
continuum. 
 More sensitive individuals are those with higher average ratings of violence 
severity across many behaviors. At least this was true for V2, V3, and V4 behaviors; 
however, the groups did not vary as much in their evaluations of V1 (see also Collyer, 
Brell, Moster, & Furey, 2011) because almost all of the severity ratings for V1 
behaviors were very high. Later studies by Collyer and Melisi (2008), and Egan 
(2010) have shown that the apparent similarity of the two groups in rating V1 
behaviors was a ceiling effect caused by the use of closed-ended Likert scales in the 
original study. When open-ended magnitude estimation methods are used, the 
expected difference between violence sensitive and violence tolerant individuals is 
still seen. 
 A subsequent study by Collyer et al. (2011) aimed to fully describe individual 
differences in sensitivity to violence. Results showed a gender difference with women 
scoring higher in violence sensitivity than men. Participants had the opportunity to 
classify themselves as violent-sensitive or violent-tolerant, and results showed that 
their self-descriptions correlated with their classification using severity ratings. This 
suggests some degree of self-awareness regarding violence sensitivity or tolerance. In 
the study, the authors suggested that violence sensitive individuals seem to have a 
more inclusive understanding of what violence includes, embracing such things as 
verbal abuse and inaction. 
A study by Collyer, Johnson, de Mesquita, and Palazzo (2010) addressed the 
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question of whether people who are violence-tolerant continue to be so after 
nonviolence training, or if they can become violence-sensitive. The results suggest that 
participants exposed to nonviolence training that learn about nonviolence problem-
solving rated violent behaviors higher than before their exposure, and so become more 
sensitive to violence than participants who are not exposed to nonviolence education. 
Empathy 
Empathy refers to the “reactions of one individual to the observed experiences 
of another” (Davis, 1983, p.113), and the degree to which individuals can put 
themselves in the position of others. Hoffman (1990), similarly to Davis, refers to 
empathetic affect as the “affective response more appropriate to the other’s situation 
than to one’s own” (p. 157.) 
Many times people are empathetic toward others because the other person is 
going through a difficult time, and sometimes people might believe the suffering is 
unjust. Hoffman (1990) suggests that empathetic affect can lead to “moral 
development, and just behavior” (p. 151) especially when it comes to empathic 
distress. Empathetic distress, as explained by Hoffman, refers to the negative feelings 
caused by another person’s distress. 
Hoffman (1990) proposes a series of related affects that result from empathetic 
affect. One of them is sympathetic distress, this occurs when it is known that the 
victim is suffering, and the suffering is out of his or her control. Empathic anger 
focuses on the perpetrator and not the victim. This anger might shift to the victim if 
the bystander learns that somehow the victim did something or instigated the 
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perpetrator and so deserves the suffering, or if the victim has maintained the status as a 
victim for a while, and has not done anything to change it. Thus, the anger might 
increase toward the victim, and decrease toward the perpetrator, and the empathy 
might increase towards the perpetrator. Guilt feelings occur when the bystander or the 
observer is the person responsible for the suffering of the other person; the perpetrator 
can experience self-blame, as well as both empathic and sympathetic distress. 
Someone might experience empathetic feelings of injustice when there is 
inconsistency between the victim’s suffering and his or her behaviors. This could 
reflect a BJW, previously discussed. As expressed by Hoffman, “empathic distress 
may be transformed by the lack of reciprocity between character and outcomes into a 
feeling of injustice” (p. 160.) In other words, if it is believed that the victim is a good 
person who does not deserve suffering, the empathic distress might increase, whereas 
if it is believed that the victim is not a good person and deserves the suffering; the 
observer might not feel empathy towards the victim. This lack of consistency that 
leads to empathic distress can change into empathetic feelings of injustice. It is 
important to note that there is no need for a victim to be physically present in order for 
a person to experience empathy; a person can learn about the victim in some other 
ways “because humans have the capacity for representation and represented events can 
evoke empathic affect” (Hoffman, 1990, p. 169.) 
As suggested by Hoffman, there is a relationship between empathy and 
justice/injustice. A recent study by Decety and Yoder (2016) analyzed the relationship 
between the different components of empathy (affective, motivational, and cognitive) 
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and sensitivity to injustice. The results showed that people who are more empathically 
concerned with others, and are less coldhearted (based on the psychopathy scale) are 
more sensitive to injustices other people might experience. Results also suggested that 
justice sensitivity for others can be predicted when people are more cognitively 
empathetic, or can put themselves in the position of others.  
Actor vs. agent duality (McAdams, 2013; Frimer, Schaefer, & Oakes, 2014) 
refers to the same person being both the actor and the agent. The actor is the “watched 
self” while the agent is the “executor of action.” The actors reflect on the morality, 
mostly because they are being watched and want to appear as a good person. On the 
other hand, the executor of an action might give himself or herself permission to act in 
a more selfish way, especially if he or she believes that they are not being watched. In 
light of what has been discussed so far, a connection can be made to the actor vs. agent 
duality, specifically to the victim and perpetrator perspectives, as well as that of the 
bystander. In the case of the bystander, a person could intervene or not depending on 
how he or she sees himself or herself in that moment, as an actor (someone who is 
being watched), who feels the need to act in a moral way, or an agent (someone who 
can act in a more selfish manner). From the victim’s perspective, they might recall 
themselves as more morally inclined, since perhaps they think they are being watched, 
that someone else at least knows about the injustices committed against them. If this is 
so, then the victim might be more empathetic towards others. The perpetrator could be 
similar to the agent – the “executor of the action” - someone who behaves more 
selfishly and (clearly) less morally. A person can allow himself or herself to not act in 
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a moral way, especially if they do not care or believe that there is a bystander 
observing those behaviors. 
People can be empathetic towards others when they see someone, or read about 
a situation another person experiences. This includes reading literary fiction (Mar & 
Oatley, 2008). Individuals who create imagery when reading are more empathetic 
toward the characters in the story, and are more likely to help, thus showing an 
increase in prosocial behaviors (Johnson, Cushman, Borden, & McCune, 2013). Even 
though the literature is inconclusive, it points to people being empathetic toward 
others in a variety of ways, not only by seeing it, but by reading about it, and 
visualizing the scenario. 
Use of Words  
In addition to analyses of the stories participants have shared, either from 
previous experiences in their lives from different perspectives, or because they were 
asked to retell a story from a specific perspective, either victim or perpetrator 
(Baumeister, Stillwell, & Wotman, 1990; Stillwell & Baumeister, 1997), analyses of 
the linguistic styles associated with each perspective can help determine additional 
differences (Pennebaker & King, 1999), some of which may extend the 
characterizations of victim and perpetrator. Research by Pennebaker and King 
suggests that people are consistent “across time and situation” (p. 1308) in the way 
they express themselves in writing. Pennebaker and King analyzed the words written 
by participants from different populations who wrote about different topics in different 
contexts. 
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 A main benefit of writing is its promotion of better health (Pennebaker, 
Mayne, & Francis, 1997). The authors suggest that writing promotes better physical 
health because of the use of cognitive processing. Cognitive processing refers to (a) a 
self-reflective thinking or use of insight, and (b) causal thinking. Word choice offers 
clues to this processing; words that refer to insight include realize, see, understand, 
and words that refer to causation include because, why, thus. 
 Pennebaker, Mayne, and Francis (1997) proposed that the way people think, 
and the words chosen to express and talk about situations or events can help improve 
their health when writing positive emotions. Results showed that the use of “more 
negative emotion words and fewer positive emotion words was linked with more 
negative outcomes in the month after writing” (p. 866.) 
 In his book, The Secret Life of Pronouns, Pennebaker (2011) suggests how the 
use of some words can vary depending on the person. For example, individuals in 
higher positions or in positions of power and those in lower positions use different 
words. Pronouns associated with status, power, self-confidence, arrogance, and 
leadership include the pronouns I, we, and you (Pennebaker, 2011.) The tense of the 
verbs can also change based on the emotions a person experiences (Pennebaker, 
2011.) A person who feels angry is more likely to use you, he, and they at a higher 
rate, verbs in present tense, and more cognitive words. People who feel happy use we 
more often, and concrete nouns. Individuals who feel sad use more I- words, future 
and past verbs and more cognitive words. By I- words Pennebaker refers to first 
person singular pronouns such as I, me, my. 
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A study by Kowalski (2000) researched the perspectives of victims and 
perpetrators regarding teasing. In this study participants were asked to tell two 
different stories that they had experienced (similar to Baumeister, Stillwell, and 
Wotman, 1990), one where they where teased (victim perspective), and another were 
they teased someone else (perpetrator perspective). To analyze the stories Kowalski 
used a linguistic analysis tool, the Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count (LIWC) 
computer program. Results showed that negative emotion words, such as angry, 
ashamed, and worthless were mostly used in stories that were narrated from a 
perpetrators’ perspective rather than a victim’s perspective. Results also suggested that 
victims felt “more negatively” than perpetrators about the experience, and that victims 
believed perpetrators do not feel strongly negative about the event. Results also 
showed that victims felt more annoyed by the experience than perpetrators, and that 
perpetrators felt the experience was more humorous and also felt more guilt about it 
than the victims. 
Writing about their experiences from a victim’s perspective, participants used 
“more self-references” and “more words” (p. 235) than perpetrators (Kowalski, 2000). 
However, when writing about their experiences from the perpetrators perspective 
participants referred more to others. Kowalski suggests that the low use of self-
references by perpetrators in their narratives and the report of guilt of the experiences 
“may reflect attempts to distance themselves from their personal involvement in the 
teasing incident” (p. 239.) 
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Research Questions 
The current study examined the words used by participants as a function of the 
perspectives to which they were assigned. The present study also examined the 
relationship of violence sensitivity and empathy based on the different perspectives 
assigned. Below are the research questions addressed in the study. 
1. Words consistent with higher-status positions. Participants assigned to the 
perpetrator perspective will use more third person pronouns, and words in the 
present and future focus, than participants assigned to the victim and bystander 
perspective. It is expected that there will be significant differences between the 
groups, and participants assigned to the perpetrator perspective will use more 
words on the categories representative of people in higher status.  
2. Words consistent with lower-status positions. Participants assigned to the 
victim perspective will use more first person pronouns, and words in the past 
focus, than participants assigned to the bystander and perpetrator perspective. 
It is expected that there will be significant differences between the groups, and 
participants assigned to the victim perspective will use more words on the 
categories representative of people in lower status.  
3. Group differences in Empathy. The differences in empathy based on the 
different perspectives (victim, perpetrator and bystander), and the media in 
which it was presented were examined. Participants assigned to the victim 
perspective were expected to score higher in the empathy subscales than 
participants assigned to the perpetrator and bystander perspectives. 
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4. Group differences in Violence Severity. The differences in violence severity 
based on the different perspectives (victim, perpetrator and bystander), and the 
media in which it was presented were examined. Participants assigned to the 
victim perspective were expected to score higher in violence sensitivity than 
participants assigned to the perpetrator and bystander perspective. 
5. Group differences in Empathy and Violence Sensitivity. The correlation 
between violence sensitivity and empathy was analyzed. A positive strong 
correlation between violence sensitivity and empathy was expected. This 
relationship was expected to change based on the perspective assigned and the 
media in which it was presented to participants.   
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CHAPTER 2 
 
METHODOLOGY 
 
Design 
The current study was a between-subject experimental design in which 
participants were randomly assigned to one of six groups. The 6 groups represent a 2 
X 3 two-way factorial design in which the first factor was the media used to present 
the scenario: news video clip or a news article (See Appendix A for the news article 
and the link to the video.) The second factor was the perspective participants were 
assigned to: victim, perpetrator or bystander. 
Participants 
Undergraduate students from the University of Rhode Island were recruited to 
participate, mostly from undergraduate psychology courses. Participants needed to be 
18 years old or older. Participants were mostly females, (n = 210, N = 289) whose age 
ranged from 18 to 63 (M = 20.26, SD = 3.41). The participants were Caucasian 
(83.6%), Latino (4.9%), and African American (4.5%). Most of the participants were 
Catholic (32.5%), Christian (20.1%), or did not identify with any religion (23.9%). 
Participation was voluntary and confidential, and in exchange for their participation, 
participants received extra credit for the course from which they were recruited. 
Procedure 
In order to participate, interested participants went to the link provided to 
complete the survey located in REDCap (Harris et al., 2009.) Once participants went 
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to the REDCap website, they downloaded the Consent Form and agreed to the terms 
before continuing. Participants completed a series of demographic items (See 
Appendix B) and then were randomly assigned to one of the six groups. Here they 
were instructed to either read a news article of the event, or watch a video clip of the 
same event and imagine themselves to be in the position of, or in the shoes of Zinedine 
Zidane, Marco Materazzi, or the person filming the video. The article participants read 
and the video clip they watched was from the France vs. Italy 2006 World Cup 
Championship Game. In the final minutes (110th minute) of the 2006 World Cup 
Championship Game Zidane and Materazzi started exchanging words back and forth, 
and the argument culminated when Zidane from the French team “rammed his head 
into the chest” (Moore, 2006) of the Italian player, Materazzi. Participants who were 
asked to put themselves in the position of Zidane were the ones in the perpetrator 
perspective; participants who were asked to put themselves in the shoes of Materazzi 
were in the victim perspective; and the participants who were asked to put themselves 
in the position of the person filming the video were in the position of the bystander. 
Participants completed a series of open-ended questions about the event they 
learned. These questions varied regarding the perspective assigned to them (see 
Appendix B for the full list of questions). Participants were asked to describe the 
events that led to the fight, to mention what the other player had said or done that was 
hurtful to them (in the case of the victims and perpetrators) or what did both players 
do that was hurtful (for the bystander). After participants answered the open-ended 
questions, a short survey regarding empathy, perspective taking, violence sensitivity, 
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and social desirability followed. 
Materials 
Empathy Participants answered the Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI) 
(Davis, 1980) by answering how much they agreed with each statement using a Likert 
rating from 1 (not at all) to 5 (very strongly). This scale consisted of 4 subscales of 7 
items each. The four subscales included: Fantasy, Perspective-Taking, Empathetic 
Concern, and Personal Distress. Davis (1983) analyzed reliability of the subscales by 
gender, because of the known differences in empathy between males and females 
(Mehrabian & Epstein, 1972; Hoffman, 1977). Test-retest reliabilities were high for all 
four subscales for genders, males (.61-.79), and females (.62-.81.) 
Perspective Taking Participants were asked three questions regarding how 
easy or challenging it was for them to adopt the instructed perspective. These items 
were measured with a Likert rating from 1 (not at all) to 5 (very strongly.) 
Violence Sensitivity Participants also completed the Violence Sensitivity 
Scale (Collyer et al, 2007) that estimates how sensitive participants were to violence. 
This scale is also a Likert rating from 1 (not at all violent) to 7 (extremely violent). 
This scale consists of 16 items consisting of violent behavior words. To this list of 
violent behaviors, one more behavior was added, the behavior the participants learned 
about, head-butting. Participants were asked to rate this behavior as part of the 
Violence Sensitivity Scale. These lists of behaviors include four types of violence: less 
severe physical, more severe physical, less severe nonphysical, and more severe 
nonphysical (Collyer et al., 2007). The analyses by Collyer et al., suggested two 
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groups based on the severity ratings: a violence sensitive group (VS), and a violence 
tolerant group (VT), as well as four types of violence V1 – more severe physical, V2 – 
less severe physical, V3 – more severe nonphysical, V3 – less severe nonphysical. 
Social Desirability Finally, participants completed the shorter version of the 
Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability Scale (Reynolds, 1982). This shorter version 
consists of 13 out of the 33 original items. In the original version participants 
answered in a binary format (true-false) and it showed good reliability (.76) as well as 
good validity (r = .93, r2 = .86) (Reynolds, 1982.) For this study participants were 
asked to rate how much they agreed with the statements in a Likert-type scale from 
1(not at all) to 5 (very strongly).  
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CHAPTER 3 
 
RESULTS 
 
Once the data were gathered, a Microsoft Excel spreadsheet with the data was 
downloaded from REDCap, and uploaded into an SPSS version 23 file. Before 
analyzing the open-ended question data with LIWC, the answers to the open-ended 
questions were screened for a more accurate analysis. The corrections done to answers 
of the open-ended questions included eliminating abbreviations of word and 
apostrophe use, and correcting grammatical errors. Participants were excluded from 
the sample if they did not answer the questions, “Please describe your thoughts and 
feelings just prior to the event,” “Please describe your thoughts and feelings at the 
moment of the event,” and “Please describe your thoughts and feelings after the 
event,” and did not follow instructions, answered the questions using a different 
perspective other than the perspective assigned (i.e., participants who were assigned to 
the victim or perpetrator perspective and answered from a bystanders perspective, or 
their personal perspective), and participants who answered the questions with only one 
word or were extremely vague in their answers. The manipulation check items for 
adopting the perspective assigned of the participants who were not excluded from the 
sample showed the participants did not experience difficulty adopting the randomly 
assigned perspective (M = 3.43, SD = .77). 
Once corrections to the open ended questions were finalized, the answers were 
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analyzed using the LIWC program (Pennebaker, Booth, Boyd, & Francis, 2015.) The 
output of this program provides around 90 different variables, and incudes a word 
count of the segment provided by each participant, as well as some general descriptors 
or categories that include the percentage of words in a category used per sentence, 
words captured by their dictionary, and words that are longer than six letters 
(Pennebaker et al., 2015). The outcome also provides 21 standard linguistic 
dimensions; the ones used for this study were pronouns (personal, first person 
singular, third person singular). Categories also included 41 psychological constructs 
from which affect (negative emotion: anger and anxiety), cognitive process (insight 
and causation), and time orientation (past, present and future focus) were used for this 
study. Finally, the LIWC outcome provides personal concern categories, informal 
language markers, and punctuation categories, though none of these categories were 
relevant for the purpose of this study. 
The words of the answers used for the open-ended questions “Please describe 
your thoughts and feelings just prior to the event,” “Please describe your thoughts and 
feelings at the moment of the event,” and “Please describe your thoughts and feelings 
after the event” were analyzed to determine if participants used words at different rates 
based on the assigned perspective and media by which the scenario was presented. 
Even though these were three separate questions, these were analyzed as one question 
or segment in LIWC. This provided a more comprehensive account of how 
participants would have felt if they were in the randomly assigned position of 
perpetrator, victim or bystander. Before conducting the inferential analyses, the 
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dependent variables of interest obtained from LIWC were tested for the normality 
assumption by the independent variable of perspective groups (perpetrator, victim, and 
bystander). Few of the dependent variables abided by this assumption. 
Not all the word categories provided by LIWC for the different perspectives 
reflected a normal distribution. The category of past focus was normally distributed 
for two of three groups. Bystander had a skewness of .055 (SE = .211) and kurtosis of 
.039 (SE =  .419), and the victim group with a skewness of .303 (SE = .291) and 
kurtosis of .031 (SE = .575), however the perpetrator group was not normally 
distributed as assessed by the Shapiro-Wilk test (p < .05). Personal pronouns were 
normally distributed for the perpetrator group, with a skewness of -.322 (SE = .255) 
and kurtosis of .636 (SE =. 506), and victim groups with a skewness of .562 (SE = 
.291) and kurtosis of .459 (SE = .574), but not for the bystander group as assessed by 
Shapiro-Wilk test (p = .030). The category of cognitive process was normally 
distributed for the perpetrator group with a skewness of .436 (SE = .255) and kurtosis 
of .383 (SE = .506), however it was not normally distributed for the bystander and 
victim groups, as assessed by the Shapiro-Wilk test (p < .05). The category of negative 
emotion was only normally distributed for the victim group with a skewness of .426 
(SE = .291), and kurtosis of -.223, SE = .574, but not for the other two group 
perspectives (perpetrator and victim). For the category of affect, the perpetrator group 
was normally distributed, with a skewness of .340 (SE = .255) and kurtosis of .144 
(SE =. 506), and victim groups with a skewness of  .042 (SE = .291) and kurtosis of -
.739 (SE = .574), but not for the bystander group as assessed by the Shapiro-Wilk test 
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(p < .05). The assumption of normality was not met for the other categories: word 
count, first person singular pronoun, third person singular pronouns, insight, anger, 
cause, present focus, and future focus based on the Shapiro-Wilk test (p < .05). 
Word use based on perspective 
Before analyzing all the variables, a Kruskal-Wallis test was conducted to 
determine if there were differences within the word count between the perspective 
groups levels: "perpetrator" (n = 89), "bystander" (n = 132), and "victim" (n = 68) 
groups. Distributions of word count were similar for all groups, as assessed by visual 
inspection of a boxplot. Word count was significantly different between the different 
levels of perspective group, χ2(2) = 8.963, p = .011. Subsequently, pairwise 
comparisons were performed using Dunn's (1964) procedure with a Bonferroni 
correction for multiple comparisons. Post hoc analysis revealed statistically significant 
differences in word count between the bystander (Mdn = 136) and perpetrator (Mdn = 
110) groups (p = .015). There was no significant difference between the perpetrator 
and victims (Mdn = 117.50) groups (p = 1.00), and between victim and bystander (p = 
.135). This suggests that the only difference between the perspective groups for word 
count was between perpetrator and bystander perspective. 
Words consistent with higher-status positions. 
As proposed in the hypothesis, words associated with higher-status position 
include higher use of third person pronouns and words with a present and future focus. 
This study aimed to determine if the words used by participants assigned to the 
perpetrator perspective were similar to those in a higher-status position. Because most 
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of the dependent variables failed to meet the normality assumptions required for an 
analysis of variance (ANOVA) test, a series of nonparametric Kruskal-Wallis tests 
were performed. 
Personal Pronouns 
For the dependent variable personal pronouns (i.e. I, them, her) median scores 
were significantly different between the levels of perspective group, χ2(2) = 91.854, p 
< .001. Pairwise comparisons were performed using Dunn's (1964) procedure with a 
Bonferroni correction for multiple comparisons, and the adjusted p-values are 
presented. Post hoc analysis revealed statistically significant differences in personal 
pronouns scores for all group comparisons, between bystander (Mdn = 8.32) and 
perpetrator (Mdn = 15.85) (p < .001), between bystander and victim (Mdn = 12.84) (p 
< .001), and between the victim and perpetrator perspective groups (p = .027). 
To determine the differences in the third person singular pronouns category 
(she, her, him) between perspective group levels: "perpetrator" (n = 89), "bystander" 
(n = 132), and "victim" (n = 68) groups, a Kruskal-Wallis test was conducted. 
Distributions of third person singular pronoun scores were similar for all groups, as 
assessed by visual inspection of a boxplot. The medians of third person singular 
pronoun scores increased from bystander (Mdn = 1.81), to victim (Mdn = 2.08), to 
perpetrator (Mdn = 2.27), but these differences were not significantly different 
between the levels of perspective group, χ2(2) = .855, p = .652. Even though results 
suggest that the median in regards the use of third person singular pronouns is higher 
among participants in the perpetrator groups, there was not enough evidence to make a 
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significant difference between the different perspectives of the groups. 
Present and Future Focus 
A Kruskal-Wallis test was conducted to determine differences between the 
perspectives in regard to present and future focus words. Distributions of present and 
future focus scores were similar for all groups, as assessed by visual inspection of a 
boxplot. Median present focus (i.e., today, is, now) scores were not significantly 
different between the different levels of perspective group, χ2(2) = 3.567, p = .168. 
Nevertheless, the median scores increased by groups: perpetrator (Mdn = 5), victim 
(Mdn = 5.41), and bystander (Mdn = 6.23). Even though results were not significant, 
the pattern in the means suggest that contrary to hypothesis, participants in the 
perpetrator groups did not use words in a present focus more than participants in the 
victim and bystander groups. On the contrary, the median suggests that perpetrators 
used words on present focus less than participants assigned to the victim and bystander 
perspectives. 
For the dependent variable future focus (i.e., may, will, soon), median scores 
were significantly different between the levels of perspective group, χ2(2) = 7.574, p = 
.023. Pairwise comparisons were performed using Dunn's (1964) procedure with a 
Bonferroni correction for multiple comparisons, and adjusted p-values are presented. 
Post hoc analysis revealed no significant differences in future focus scores for the 
group comparisons, between perpetrator (Mdn = 0) and bystander (Mdn = .93), p = 
.093, between victim (Mdn = 0) and bystander, p = .051, and between the victim and 
perpetrator perspective groups (p = 1.00). Results suggest an extremely low use of 
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future focus words for all three groups. Results show a trend for a difference between 
the groups. However, based on the medians participants in the bystander group 
seemed to use the words with a focus on future at a higher rate, and the perpetrators 
and victims at a lower rate. 
Negative Emotion and Anger 
A Kruskal-Wallis test was conducted to determine if there were differences in 
the categories of negative emotion and anger between groups that differed in the 
perspective level. Distributions of negative emotion, and anger scores were similar for 
all groups, as assessed by visual inspection of a boxplot. For the negative emotion 
(i.e., hurt, ugly, nasty) category, median negative emotion scores were significantly 
different between the different levels of perspective group, χ2(2) = 27.871, p < .001. 
Subsequently, pairwise comparisons were performed using Dunn's (1964) procedure 
with a Bonferroni correction for multiple comparisons. Adjusted p-values are 
presented. This post hoc analysis revealed statistically significant differences in 
negative emotion scores for the group comparisons, between bystander (Mdn = 3.67) 
and victim (Mdn = 5.77), p < .001, and between bystander and perpetrator (Mdn = 
5.97), p < .001, but not significantly different between the victim and perpetrator 
perspective groups, p = 1.00. Similarly to the results of affective processes, there was 
a difference between participants who were assigned to the victim and bystander 
perspectives, and perpetrators and bystander perspective, but no difference between 
participants in the victim and perpetrator perspective for negative emotions. The 
medians suggest the victims and perpetrators use negative emotion words at similar 
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rates that are higher than bystanders.  
For the dependent variable of anger (i.e., hurt, kill, annoyed) median personal 
pronoun scores were significantly different between the different perspective groups, 
χ2(2) = 41.432, p < .001. Subsequently, pairwise comparisons were performed using 
Dunn's (1964) procedure with a Bonferroni correction for multiple comparisons. 
Adjusted p-values are presented. This post hoc analysis revealed statistically 
significant differences in anger scores for the group comparisons, between bystander 
(Mdn = 1.23) and victim (Mdn = 2.43), p = .003, and between bystander and 
perpetrator (Mdn = 3.39), p < .001, but no significant difference between victim and 
perpetrator perspective groups, p = .055. Similar to the results of affect process, and 
negative emotion, there were significant differences between bystander and victim, 
and bystander and perpetrator, but no significant differences between the victim and 
perpetrator perspective. Based on the median scores it is suggested that contrary to 
hypothesis, participants assigned to the perpetrator perspective used more anger words 
than victims, and participants in the bystander perspective used anger words at a lower 
rate. 
Words consistent with lower-status positions 
This study also aimed to determine if words used by participants who were 
randomly assigned to the victim perspective resembled the words used by people in a 
lower-status position. More specifically, it aimed to determine if participants assigned 
to the victim perspective group used a higher count of first person singular pronouns, 
words with a past focus, words associated with affect, and cognitive words including 
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insight and causation words than the perpetrator and bystander perspective groups. 
First Person Singular Pronoun 
A Kruskal-Wallis test was conducted to determine if there were differences in 
the first person singular pronouns (i.e., I, me, mine) category between groups that 
differed in perspective: the "perpetrator" (n = 89), "bystander" (n = 132), and "victim" 
(n = 68). Distributions of first person singular pronouns were similar in distribution for 
all groups, as assessed by visual inspection of a boxplot. Median first person singular 
pronouns scores were significantly different between the different levels of 
perspective group, χ2(2) = 107. 202, p < .001. Subsequently, pairwise comparisons 
were performed using Dunn's (1964) procedure with a Bonferroni correction for 
multiple comparisons. Adjusted p-values are presented. The post hoc analysis revealed 
a statistically significant difference in first person singular pronouns scores for all 
group comparisons, between bystander (Mdn = 5.42) and victim (Mdn = 9.70), p < 
.001, bystander and perpetrator (Mdn = 12.28), p < .001 perspective groups, as well as 
between the victim and perpetrator perspective groups, p = .005. Even though the 
results suggest a difference between the combinations of all groups, the differences 
were not as expected in how much the first person singular pronouns were used by the 
different groups. Based on the medians of the groups, participants assigned to the 
perpetrator perspective used first person pronouns at a higher rate than participants in 
the victim and bystander groups, and participants in the bystander group used first 
singular personal pronouns at a lower rate than the other two groups. It was 
hypothesized that the participants in the victim perspective would use these words at a 
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higher rate, but results suggested perpetrators use these words more. 
Past Focus 
A Kruskal-Wallis test was conducted to determine if there were differences in 
the past focus category (i.e., ago, did, talked) between the groups that differed in 
perspective. Distributions of past focus scores were similar for all groups, as assessed 
by visual inspection of a boxplot. Median past focus scores were not significantly 
different between the different levels of perspective group, χ2(2) = 1.696, p = .428. 
Nevertheless, the median increased by groups, victim (Mdn = 10.63), perpetrator (Mdn 
= 10.64), and bystander (Mdn = 11.48). Even though results were not significant, the 
pattern of median scores suggests the opposite of the proposed hypothesis that 
participants assigned to the victim perspective would use past focus words at lower 
rates than the other two perspectives. 
Affective Process 
A Kruskal-Wallis test was conducted to determine if there were differences in 
the affective process category between groups that differed in the perspective level. 
Distributions of affective process were similar for all groups, as assessed by visual 
inspection of a boxplot. Median affective process (i.e., happy, cried) scores were 
significantly different between the different perspective groups, χ2(2) = 39.735, p < 
.001. Subsequently, pairwise comparisons were performed using Dunn's (1964) 
procedure with a Bonferroni correction for multiple comparisons. Adjusted p-values 
are presented. This post hoc analysis revealed statistically significant differences in 
affective process scores for group comparisons between bystander (Mdn = 6.09) and 
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victim (Mdn = 9.04), p < .001, and bystander and perpetrator (Mdn = 9.09), p < .001 
perspective groups, but there was not a significant difference between the victim and 
perpetrator perspective groups, p = 1.00. There was a difference between participants 
assigned to the bystander perspective and the other two groups, victim and perpetrator, 
but not between victim and perpetrator. Thus, victim and perpetrator used more words 
in the category of affective process than bystanders did, and they seemed to use it at 
very similar rates. Results do not fully support the proposed hypothesis; participants in 
the victim perspective do not use affective process words at a higher rate than 
participants in the perpetrator perspective, but participants in the victim perspective do 
so more than participants in the bystander perspective. 
Cognitive Process, Insight and Causation  
A Kruskal-Wallis test was conducted to determine if there were differences in 
the cognitive process category, insight and causation, between groups that differed in 
perspective. Distributions of cognitive process scores (i.e., cause, know, ought) were 
similar for all groups, as assessed by visual inspection of a boxplot. Median cognitive 
process scores were significantly different between the different levels of perspective 
group, χ2(2) = 13.289, p = .001. Subsequently, pairwise comparisons were performed 
using Dunn's (1964) procedure with a Bonferroni correction for multiple comparisons. 
Adjusted p-values are presented. This post hoc analysis revealed statistically 
significant differences in cognitive process scores for the group comparisons, between 
perpetrator (Mdn = 13.16) and bystander (Mdn = 15.37), p = .004, and between victim 
(Mdn = 12.25) and bystander, p = .017, but not a significant difference between victim 
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and perpetrator perspectives, p = 1.00. Results suggest that participants assigned to the 
bystander perspective use more words in the cognitive process category than 
participants in the perpetrator and victim perspective, as suggested by the medians. 
And though not statistically significant, perpetrators used more cognitive process 
words than victims. The hypothesis suggested is partly supported: there is a difference 
between the groups’ use of cognitive process words. However, participants in the 
victims group do not use more cognitive process words compared to the other two 
groups, instead participants in the bystander groups mostly used these words. 
For the variables insight (i.e., think, know), and causation (i.e., because, effect) 
the median scores were not significantly different between the different levels of 
perspective group, χ2(2) = 4.895, p = .086, for insight, and χ2(2) = 1.436, p = .488, for 
cause. Nevertheless the median increased by groups for insight (perpetrator (Mdn = 
3.03), victim (Mdn = 3.145) and bystander (Mdn = 3.70)) and for causation 
(perpetrator (Mdn = 1.43), victim (Mdn = 1.525) and bystander (Mdn = 1.64)). Thus 
results suggest that participants in all perspective groups seem to use insight and 
causation words at a very similar rate, but it is still seen based on the median scores 
that participants in the bystander perspective use insight and causation words at a 
higher rate, and participants in the perpetrator perspective use these words at a lower 
rate. 
Word use based on media 
This study also aimed to understand the differences between the two ways of 
learning about the head-butting event (watched a video or read a news article), in the 
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categories of the words previously discussed. Similarly to the previous set of analyses, 
not all the word categories provided by LIWC for media used reflected a normal 
distribution. Past focus and regular verbs were the only categories that were normally 
distributed for both groups. For the past focus dependent variable, the group that 
watched a video had a skewness of  .050 (SE = .187) and kurtosis of -.393 (SE = 
.371), and the groups who read the article had a skewness of -.032 (SE = .221) and 
kurtosis of -.242 (SE = .438), as assessed by the Shapiro Wilk test (p > .05). 
The category of cognitive process was also normally distributed for the groups 
who watched the video with a skewness of .227 (SE = .187) and kurtosis of -.218 (SE 
= .371), but not for the groups who read the article, as assessed by the Shapiro Wilk 
test, p < .05. This assumption of normality was not met for the other categories: 
personal pronoun, first person singular pronoun, third person singular pronouns, 
affective words, negative emotions, anger, insight, causation, focus present, and focus 
future based on the Shapiro Wilk test (p < .05). For the variables, Mann-Whitney U 
tests were performed given that the dependent variables did not meet the assumption 
of normality. 
First, a Mann-Whitney U test was run to determine if there were differences in 
the word count between the media assigned to participants (video watched, n = 169, 
and article read, n = 120). Distributions of the use of personal pronouns were similar 
as assessed by visual inspection. Word count was not significantly different between 
participants who watched the video (Mdn = 120) than for participants who read the 
article (Mdn = 127.5), U = 10679, z = .770, p = .441. This suggested that participants 
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used a similar number of words regardless of how they learned about the scenario. 
Personal Pronouns 
A Mann-Whitney U test was performed to determine if there were differences 
in the use of personal pronouns, and first person singular pronouns between the media 
assigned to participants (video watched and article read). Distributions of the use of 
personal pronouns, and first person singular pronouns were similar as assessed by 
visual inspection. Personal pronoun use was significantly higher for participants who 
watched the video (Mdn = 11.41) than for participants who read the article (Mdn = 
9.81), U = 8079, z = -2.944, p = .003. First person singular pronoun use was also 
significantly higher for participants who watched the video (Mdn = 8.75) than for 
participants who read the article (Mdn = 6.71), U = 8229, z = -2.73, p = .006, 
suggesting a higher use of personal pronouns and first person singular pronouns in 
participants who watched the video. 
To determine if there were differences in the third person singular pronouns 
category (she, her, him), a Mann-Whitney U test was run. Distributions of third person 
singular pronoun scores were similar for both groups, as assessed by visual inspection. 
The medians of third person singular pronoun scores increased from participants who 
read an article (Mdn = 1.81) to those who watched a video (Mdn = 2.08), but this 
difference was not significantly different U = 9298, z = -1.226, p = .220. 
Past, Present and Future Focus 
To determine group differences in past, present and future focus, a Mann-
Whitney U test was run to determine if there were differences between the two media 
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groups. Distributions of past, present and future focus scores were similar for all 
groups as assessed by visual inspection. Present focus (i.e., today, is, now) use was not 
significantly different between participants who watched the video (Mdn = 5.77) than 
for participants who read the article (Mdn = 5.84), U = 10487.5, z = .496, p = .620. 
Similarly, future focus (i.e., may, will, soon) word use was not significantly different 
between participants who watched the video (Mdn = 0) than for participants who read 
the article (Mdn = 0), U = 9745, z = -.612, p = .540. Finally, past focus was not 
significantly different between participants who watched the video (Mdn = 11.30) and 
participants who read the article (Mdn = 10.90), U = 9204, z = -1.337, p = .181. Thus 
results suggest the participants use words of the past, present and future focus at the 
same rate regardless of the media by which the learned about the scenario. 
Affective Process, Negative Emotion, and Anger 
A Mann-Whitney U test was run to determine if there were differences for the 
affective process words, negative emotion and anger word use between the media 
assigned to participants. Distributions of the use of the affective process words were 
similar as assessed by visual inspection. Affective process word use, and anger word 
use were not significantly different between participants who watched the video than 
for participants who read the article (U = 9084, z = -1.508, p = .131; U = 9564, z = -
.828, p = .407 respectively.) In the same pattern of previous results, the median use of 
affective words for participants who watched the video was higher (Mdn = 8.05), than 
for participants assigned to read the article (Mdn = 7.64). Participants who watched 
the video also had higher medians for anger words (Mdn = 2.04), than participants 
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who read the article (Mdn = 1.82) However, negative emotion words were 
significantly higher in the video (Mdn = 5.00), than the article (Mdn = 4.19), U = 
8691.5, z = -2.069, p = .039. 
Cognitive Process, Insight and Causation 
A Mann-Whitney U test was conducted to determine if there were differences 
in the cognitive process category, insight and causation, between the two media 
groups. Distributions of cognitive process scores (i.e., cause, know, ought), insight 
(i.e., think, know), and causation (i.e., because, effect) were similar for all groups, as 
assessed by visual inspection. Cognitive process words were not significantly different 
between video (Mdn = 14.63) and article (Mdn = 13.75), U = 9598, z = -.774, p = .439. 
Causation words were not significantly different between video (Mdn = 1.53) and 
article (Mdn = 1.64), U = 10553.5, z = .599, p = .549. Finally, insight words were not 
significantly different between video (Mdn = 3.65) and article (Mdn = 2.93), U = 
9244.5, z = -1.280, p = .201). 
Even though the use of words was not significantly different for all categories 
based on media groups, there is a pattern that shows that for the most part participants 
who watched the video used more of these words for all categories, but used a similar 
total word count. This is reflected in the word count category where it was significant 
that participants who watched the video used more words than participants who read 
the article. This seems to indicate that participants who watched the video can describe 
what happened in more detail and more words. Participants experienced it differently 
based on the media assigned and it was reflected in the use of personal pronouns, first 
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person pronouns, and negative emotions.  
Group differences in Empathy and Violence Sensitivity  
Another purpose of this study is to determine if the different groups defined by 
the factors perspective and media differed on the empathy and violence sensitivity of 
participants. The following analyses are directed to understand these differences 
between the groups. 
Group differences in Empathy 
Given that participants were mostly female (female n = 210; male n = 77), a 
one-way multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) was run to determine the effect 
of participant’s sex on their scores in the IRI. The four subscales of IRI were assessed: 
Empathetic Concern, Fantasy, Perspective Taking, and Personal Distress. The 
differences between the sexes on the combined dependent variables was significant, 
F(4, 267) = 8.031, p < .001; Wilks' Λ = .893; partial η2 = .998. Follow-up univariate 
ANOVAs showed that Empathic Concern, (F(1, 270) = 21.496, p < .001; partial η2 = 
.074), Fantasy (F(1, 270) = 10.465, p = .001; partial η2 = .037), and Personal Distress 
(F(1, 270) = 12.662, p < .001; partial η2 = .045), were significantly different between 
male and female of participants, using a Bonferroni adjusted α level of p < .0125. 
However, Perspective Taking (F(1, 270) = 1.31, p = .253; partial η2 = .005) was not 
significantly different. Female participants scored higher in all subscales of empathy 
than male participants (See Table 1). 
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Table 1 
Means and Standard Deviations for the Scores of IRI 
Empathy Subscales Sex Mean SD n 
Empathetic Concern Female 3.88 0.52 199 
 Male 3.55 0.50 73 
Fantasy Female 3.65 0.64 199 
 Male 3.37 0.59 73 
Perspective Taking Female 3.64 0.59 199 
 Male 3.55 0.59 73 
Personal Distress Female 2.95 0.66 199 
 Male 2.64 0.62 73 
 
 Before examining the differences in empathy between the different 
perspectives (victim, perpetrator and bystander), and the media used for presentation 
(read or watch), a Principal Factor Analysis was performed to determine if the 28 
items of the IRI loaded on the original subgroups (empathetic concern, fantasy, 
personal distress, and perspective taking) using SPSS version 23. The PCA with the 
sample of our participants showed five different components (instead of the original 
four) with eigenvalues exceeding 1, which explained 19.45%, 12.44%, 8.18%, 7.25%, 
and 4.83% of the variance respectively. The scree test (Catell, 1966) also suggests five 
components (see Figure 1A in Appendix C), and was further supported by the Parallel 
Analysis. The parallel analysis showed five components whose eigenvalues where 
higher than the eigenvalues provided by the PCA. 
The five-component solution explained 54.76% of the variance; each 
component explained 19.46%, 13.52%, 9.05%, 7.59%, and 5.14% of the variance 
respectively. An oblimin rotation was performed to help interpret the components. All 
components had strong loadings, however not all variables loaded specifically into a 
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component, as shown in Table 1A in Appendix C. This interpretation of the five 
components was not consistent with the model suggested by Davis (1980, 1983), 
where four components are suggested. The correlations between the five factors are 
small (Table 2). These results do not fully support the use of the items in the original 
subscales as proposed by Davis (1980, 1983.) 
A Factor Analysis establishing four components was also performed. The four-
component solution explained 49.62% of the variance; each component explained 
19.46%, 13.52%, 9.05%, and 7.59% of the variance respectively. Once again, the 
items for perspective taking, fantasy, and personal distress, for the most part loaded 
together for each factor. For the subscale of empathetic concern, most of the items 
loaded on its own factor, with the other items loading mostly with the perspective 
taking subscale items (see Table 2A in the Appendix). Not all variables loaded 
specifically into the predicted component. This interpretation of the four components 
was also not consistent with the model suggested by Davis (1980, 1983). Not all the 
items loaded in the expected subscales. The correlations between the four factors are 
small (Table 3). These results do not fully support the use of the items in the original 
subscales as proposed by Davis (1980, 1983.) 
Before proceeding with the analysis to determine the difference between 
groups for empathy, normality tests were performed for the four subscales of the IRI. 
All of the four subscales were within the normal limits. The normality tests for the 
dependent variables were done taking into account the two independent variables of 
media and perspective. For the most part the subscales complied with the normality 
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assumptions. The subscale of Empathetic Concern complied with the normality tests, 
except for the bystander perspective group. For the rest of the subscales, Fantasy, 
Perspective Taking, and Personal Distress showed normality for all six groups, 
assessed by the Shapiro-Wilk test (p < .05). 
Table 2 
Component Correlation Matrix With Five-Components: IRI 
Component Correlation Matrix       
Component 1 2 3 4 5 
1 1 
2 -0.039 1 
3 0.163 -0.034 1 
4 -0.158 -0.126 -0.125 1 
5 -0.149 -0.194 0.033 0.168 1 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.   
Rotation Method: Oblimin with Kaiser Normalization. 
 
Table 3 
Component Correlation Matrix With Four-Components: IRI 
 Component Correlation Matrix 
Component 1 2 3 4 
1 1    
2 0.064 1   
3 0.128 -0.057 1  
4 -0.188 -0.181 -0.112 1 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.    
Rotation Method: Oblimin with Kaiser Normalization. 
 
A 3 x 2 between groups multivariate analysis of covariance (MANCOVA) was 
performed as suggested by Tabachnick and Fidell (2007) to determine if there were 
differences in variables associated with empathy (empathetic concern, fantasy, 
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personal distress and perspective taking). Two independent variables were used: 
perspective (perpetrator, victim, and bystander), and media (read news article and 
watched video clip.) Adjustment was made for two covariates: sex and social 
desirability. Total N = 289 was reduced to 271 with the deletion of 19 cases that were 
missing data. Some of the assumptions for MANCOVA, including the presence of 
outliers, were violated. 
With the use of Wilk’s criterion, the combined DV’s were significantly related to 
the combined covariates, approximate F(8, 520) = 14.20, p < .001, Wilks’ Λ= .67352. 
There was a medium effect size (η2 = .18, and CI 95% (.113, .226)) between DV’s and 
the covariates. Results suggested no interaction between the independent variables 
perspective and media F(8, 520) = 1.26 p = .263, Wilks’ Λ = .96240 in the different 
empathy subscales. Results also showed no significant main effects for both 
independent variables: perspective (F(8, 520) = .71808 p = .676, Wilks’Λ = .97827) 
and media (F(4, 260) = 1.62 p = .168, Wilks’ Λ= .97561). Effect size for the non-
significant main effect of perspective was, partial η2 = .01, and CI 95% (.000, .017), 
for media, partial η2 = .02, and CI 95% (.000, .058), and for the interaction between 
perspective and media, partial η2 = .01, and CI 95% (.000, .024). Results suggest no 
significant differences between the different groups. Participants scored similarly in 
the four empathy subscales regardless of the perspective they were randomly assigned 
to, and regardless of the media by which they learned about the event. 
To have a clearer understanding of how each subscale of the IRI was influenced by 
the independent variables, adjusting for sex and social desirability, a series of 
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ANCOVAS were performed. Results suggested that for the scales of Empathetic 
Concern, Fantasy, and Perspective taking there were no interaction effects or main 
effects for either of the independent variables (media and perspective) (See Table 4.) 
The Personal Distress subscale only showed a significant effect for media (F(1, 274) = 
5.641, p = .018, with a partial η2 = .020.) These results suggest that participants scored 
higher in personal distress when they read the scenario (M = 2.97, SE = .055) than 
when they watched a video (M = 2.79, SE = .052). 
 Results showed some patterns even though they were not significant. The first 
pattern shown is that participants in the perpetrator perspective scored higher for all 
the empathy subscales, thus suggesting participants in the perpetrator perspective are 
more empathetic than participants in the bystander and victim perspective. The other 
pattern that can be seen in the results is that participants who learned about the 
scenario by reading the article scored higher in all empathy subscales than participants 
who watched the video clip of the scenario (See Figures 1-4, and Table 5). 
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Table 4  
ANCOVA Results for IRI 
 
Empathy Subscales df F Sig. partial η2  
Personal Distress     
         Interaction 2/274 2.274 0.105 0.016 
         Media 1/274 5.641 0.018 0.020 
         Perspective 2/274 0.540 0.583 0.004 
Empathetic Concern     
         Interaction 2/270 0.255 0.775 0.002 
         Media 1/270 1.586 0.208 0.006 
         Perspective 2/270 0.931 0.395 0.007 
Fantasy     
         Interaction 2/274 1.218 0.297 0.009 
         Media 1/274 1.196 0.275 0.004 
         Perspective 2/274 0.320 0.727 0.002 
Perspective Taking     
         Interaction 2/271 0.775 0.462 0.006 
         Media 1/271 0.446 0.495 0.002 
         Perspective 2/271 0.581 0.560 0.004 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Mean scores for perspective taking. 
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Figure 2. Mean scores for fantasy. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Mean scores for empathetic concern 
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Figure 4. Mean scores for personal distress. 
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Table 5  
Means, Standard Deviations and Standard Errors for IRI Subscales 
 Empathetic Concern Fantasy Perspective Taking Personal Distress 
 M (SD) M (SE) M (SD) M (SE) M (SD) M (SE) M (SD) M (SE) 
Perpetrator         
     Watched Video  3.79 (.49) 3.77 (.07) 3.50 (.61) 3.50 (.09) 3.72 (.62) 3.67 (.08) 2.70 (.72) 2.75 (.09) 
     Read Article 3.93 (.50) 3.89 (.08) 3.73 (.59) 3.69 (.10) 3.71 (.56) 3.67 (.09) 3.13 (.61) 3.12 (.10) 
Victim         
     Watched Video  3.67 (.53) 3.70 (.08) 3.51 (.68) 3.52 (.10) 3.60 (.48) 3.63 (.09) 2.79 (.58) 2.78 (.10) 
     Read Article 3.70 (.50) 3.71 (.10) 3.64 (.52) 3.66 (.12) 3.63 (.53) 3.61 (.11) 2.90 (.67) 2.95 (.11) 
Bystander         
     Watched Video  3.71 (.60) 3.73 (.07) 3.57 (.67) 3.57 (.09) 3.45 (.67) 3.50 (.08) 2.89 (.63) 2.84 (.09) 
     Read Article 3.85 (.56) 3.87 (.06) 3.49 (.69) 3.50 (.07) 3.65 (.60) 3.66 (.06) 2.84 (.67) 2.85 (.07) 
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Group differences in Violence Sensitivity 
The present study also examined the differences in violence sensitivity based 
on the different perspectives (victim, perpetrator and bystander), and the media in 
which the scenario was presented (read or watched). First, a Factor Analysis was 
performed to see if the items of the Violence Sensitivity Scale would load on the four 
categories established by Collyer, et al. (2007). The items in the Factor Analysis with 
the sample loaded correctly in the four categories. One additional item was added to 
this scale, head-butt. This item was added because it was the event the participants 
learned about when they read the article or watched the video clip. This item loaded in 
the category expected, V2 (less severe physical). 
Given the difference between the sexes of participants in the sample, a 
multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) was performed to investigate sex 
differences for the dependent variables related to violence sensitivity to determine if 
the following statistical analyses should be controlled for sex. The four subscales of 
violence sensitivity were assessed: V1, V2, V3, V4. Female participants scored higher 
for all four violence sensitivity categories than male participants (see Table 6). The 
differences between males and females for the combined dependent variables were 
statistically significant, F(4, 277) = 3.316, p = .011; Wilks' Λ = .954; partial η2 = 
.046. Follow-up univariate ANOVAs showed that the categories with less severe 
violent behaviors physical (V2) (F(1, 280) = 4.785, p = .030; partial η2 = .017) and 
non-physical (V4) (F(1, 280) = 9.823, p = .002; partial η2 = .034) were significantly 
different. The more severe violence sensitivity categories, more severe physical 
violence (V1) (F(1, 280) = 2.376, p = .124; partial η2 = .008), and more severe non-
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physical violence (V3) (F(1, 280) = 1.640, p = .201; partial η2 = .006), were not 
significantly different. Females scored higher for less severe violent behaviors than 
males. 
Table 6.  
 
Means and Standard Deviations For The Scores of Violence Sensitivity Subscales by 
Gender 
 
Violence Sensitivity  Sex Mean SD n 
V1 Female 6.82 0.30 206 
Male 6.75 0.35 76 
V2 Female 4.88 0.91 206 
Male 4.61 0.99 76 
V3 Female 4.33 1.28 206 
Male 4.11 1.32 76 
V4 Female 3.37 1.28 206 
  Male 2.81 1.47 76 
 
Before conducting a MANCOVA, the normality of the dependent variables 
was assessed. The category of Violence Sensitivity, V1, was not normally distributed, 
instead it was negatively skewed for all groups assessed by the Shapiro-Wilk's test (p 
> .05). This was somewhat expected given the extreme behaviors in this category. The 
assumption of normality for V2 was satisfied for the all group combination of 
perspective and media, as assessed by Shapiro-Wilk's test (p > .05), except for the 
group that read from a bystander perspective, as assessed by Shapiro-Wilk's test (p = 
.009). The assumption of normality for V3 scores was satisfied for all group 
combinations of perspective and media level, as assessed by Shapiro-Wilk's test (p > 
.05). For V4, similarly to V2, the normality assumptions was satisfied for all groups as 
assessed by Shapiro-Wilk's test (p > .05), except for the group that read from a 
bystander perspective, as assessed by Shapiro-Wilk's test (p = .001). 
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A 3 x 2 between subjects multivariate analysis of covariance (MANCOVA), as 
suggested by Tabachnick and Fidell (2007) was performed to determine if there were 
differences in the violence sensitivity categories based on the perspectives assigned 
and the media by which participants learned about the event. Two independent 
variables were used: perspective (perpetrator, victim, and bystander), and media (read 
news article and watched video clip.) The four categories in the Violence Sensitivity 
scale (V1, V2, V3, V4) were the dependent variables. Adjustment was made for two 
covariates: sex of participants, and social desirability scores. 
SPSS MANOVA was used for the analysis with the sequential adjustment for 
nonorthogonalty. Order of entry of the independent variables was perspective followed 
by media. Total N = 289 was reduced to n = 280 with the deletion of a 9 missing data. 
Covariates were judged to be adequately reliable for covariate analysis. 
With the use of Wilk’s criterion, the combined DV’s were significantly related 
to the combined covariates, approximate F(8, 538) = 2.16, p = .029, Wilks’ Λ = .939. 
There was a small effect size (η2 = .03, and CI 95% (.0, .050) between DV’s and the 
covariates. However, there were no significant differences for the interaction between 
perspective and media F(8, 538) = .49 p = .861, Wilks’ Λ = .995. The main effects of 
both independent variables were not significant: perspective (F(8, 538) = 1.77 p = 
.081, Wilks’ Λ = .950), and media (F (4, 269) = 2.14 p = .076, Wilks’ Λ = .969). The 
effect size for the interaction between perspective and media was of a partial η2 = .01, 
and CI 95% (.000, .009). Effect sizes for the non-significant main effect of perspective 
were partial η2 = .03, and CI 95% (.000, .042), and for the main effect of media, 
partial η2 = .03, and CI 95% (.000, .068). 
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To further understand the effect of the independent variables in the different 
categories of violence sensitivity, a series of ANCOVAS were performed. Results 
suggested a main effect for the perspective variable for both categories of violence 
sensitivity for physical behaviors. For V1 (F(2, 275) = 4.383, p = .013, partial η2 = 
.031), and V2 (F(2, 273) = 4.797, p = .009, partial η2 = .034.) For these two categories 
there was not a significant interaction between perspective and media, and no 
statistically significant main effect for media. The covariate sex was statistically 
significant for V2 (p = .044, partial η2 = .015) but not for V1 (p = .169, partial η2 = 
.007). However, the social desirability covariate was not statistically significant for V1 
(p = .146, partial η2 = .008) and V2 (p = .425, partial η2 = .002.) 
Results suggested a significant main effect for the media assigned for non 
physical behaviors: V3 (F(1, 276) = 8.867, p = .003, partial η2 = .031), and V4 (F(1, 
276) = 6.744, p = .010, partial η2 = .024.) For these two categories there was no 
significant interaction between perspective and media, and no significant main effect 
for perspective. The covariate sex was not statistically significant for V3 (p = .274, 
partial η2 = .005), but statistically significant for V4 (p = .002, partial η2 = .033). 
However, the social desirability covariate was significant for V3 (p = .012, partial η2 = 
.012), but not significant for V4 (p = .311, partial η2 = .004.) For both categories, V3 
and V4, participants who read the article were more sensitive to nonphysical violence 
than participants who watched the clip of the scenario. 
Thus, these results suggest that both independent variables have different 
effects in different categories of violence sensitivity, especially in their physical and 
nonphysical distinction. The independent variable perspective showed an effect in V1 
  59
and V2. This indicates a difference in violence sensitivity depending on the 
perspectives participants were randomly assigned to, but only for physical violence. 
However the independent variable media had an effect in non-physical behaviors, V3 
and V4 (more severe non-physical, and less severe non-physical). This indicates that 
participants are more sensitive to non-physical violent behaviors when they read the 
article instead of watching the video clip. 
There were similar patterns in the means of the four categories of violence 
sensitivity, although not significant. One of the patterns is that participants in the 
bystander perspective scored lower for all four violence sensitivity categories, and 
participants in the victim perspective scored higher in all four violence sensitivity 
categories regardless of the media by which they learned about the scenario. Another 
pattern, similar to the IRI was that participants who learned about the scenario by 
reading scored higher in the four categories of violence sensitivity (Table 7, and 
Figures 5-8). 
 
Figure 5. Mean Scores for V1. 
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Figure 6. Mean scores for V2. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7. Mean scores for V3. 
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Figure 8. Mean scores for V4 
A total score for the Violence Sensitivity scale was obtained by averaging 
across the 4 categories. A 3 x 2 between groups analysis of covariance (ANCOVA) 
was performed to determine if there was a difference in violence sensitivity total based 
on the perspective and media assigned to the groups. The independent variables were 
the perspective into which the participants were asked to “put themselves” 
(perpetrator, bystander and victim), and the media by which they learned about the 
event (read news article, or watched video clip). The dependent variable was the 
overall violence sensitivity score, and social desirability and sex were the covariates. 
After adjusting for social desirability and the sex of participants, results 
showed no significant interaction effect between perspective and media (F(2, 272) = 
.509, p = .602, partial η2 = .004). However, results showed significant main effects for 
both, perspective (F(2, 272) = 4.286, p = .015, partial η2 = .031) and media (F(1, 272) 
= 8.373, p = .004, partial η2 = .030.). Participants who read the news article were more 
violence sensitive, rating the behaviors as more violent than participants who watched 
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the video. Results also suggest there is a difference in how severe participants rated 
violent behaviors based on the perspective assigned. Participants in the bystanders’ 
perspective rated violent behaviors lower than participants in the victim and 
perpetrator perspectives. Interestingly, the biggest difference, as seen in Figure 9 is 
between the victim perspective, with participants reading the article rating the violent 
behaviors as more violent (M = 5.18, SE = .15) and participants who watched the 
video clip (M = 4.88, SE = .13.) Similarly to the previous analysis of the violence 
severity categories participants who read the article scored higher in violence 
sensitivity. 
 
 
 
Figure 9. Mean score for violence sensitivity total. 
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Table 7 
 Means, Standard Deviations and Standard Errors for Violence Sensitivity by Groups 
  V1  V2  V3  V4 
 M (SD) M (SE) M (SD) M (SE) M (SD) M (SE) M (SD) M (SE) 
Perpetrators         
   Watched Video 6.87 (.19) 6.86 (.004) 4.83 (.88) 4.82 (.133) 4.23 (1.26) 4.21 (.183) 3.14 (1.14) 3.12 (.191) 
   Read Article 6.86 (.20) 6.86 (.20) 5.01 (.93) 4.96 (.146) 4.59 (1.13) 4.53 (.200) 3.55 (1.44) 3.45 (.208) 
Victim         
   Watched Video 6.80 (.29) 6.81 (.500) 4.89 (.79) 4.91 (.150) 4.04 (1.52) 4.07 (.206) 3.11 (1.44) 3.14 (.214) 
   Read Article 6.88 (.27) 6.89 (.058) 5.11 (.99) 5.13 (.174) 4.79 (1.30) 4.80 (.240) 3.84 (1.62) 3.88 (.249) 
Bystander          
   Watched Video 6.71 (.40) 6.72 (.043) 4.49 (.87) 4.50 (.133) 3.91 (1.08) 3.95 (.178) 2.91 (1.23) 2.93 (.185) 
   Read Article 6.76 (.36) 6.77 (.035) 4.71 (.95) 4.72 (.104) 4.29 (1.33) 4.30 (.144) 3.12 (1.30) 3.14 (.149) 
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Relationship between Empathy and Violence Sensitivity 
Finally, this research study aimed to understand the relationship between the 
subscales of empathy and violence sensitivity, and whether this relationship changed 
depending on the independent variables. It was hypothesized that a positive correlation 
would exist between empathy and violence sensitivity. In other words, the higher 
participants scored in the IRI, the higher they would score in the violence sensitivity 
scale; the more empathetic people are, the more sensitive to violence they would be. 
A Pearson's product-moment correlation was run to assess the relationship 
between empathy and violence sensitivity. Preliminary analyses showed the 
relationship to be linear with both variables normally distributed, as assessed by 
Shapiro-Wilk's test (p > .05), and there were no outliers. There was a significant 
Pearson correlation between the Total Empathy and Violence Sensitivity Total (r = 
.198, p = .001), but there were no significant correlations between Total Empathy and 
Violence Sensitivity Total per groups (see Table 8, and Figures10-16) 
Table 8 
Correlations Between Empathy Total and Violence Sensitivity Total 
Groups r p 
Overall 0.198 0.001 
Perpetrator 
Watched Video 0.132 0.373 
Read Article 0.180 0.286 
Victim 
Watched Video 0.306 0.187 
Read Article 0.207 0.286 
Bystander 
Watched Video 0.196 0.055 
Read Article 0.128 0.309 
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Figure 10. Scatterplot overall correlation between empathy and violence sensitivity. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 11. Scatterplot correlation between empathy and violence sensitivity for 
perpetrator and video group.  
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Figure 12. Scatterplot correlation between empathy and violence sensitivity for 
perpetrator and read article group. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 13. Scatterplot correlation between empathy and violence sensitivity for 
bystander and video group. 
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Figure 14. Scatterplot correlation between empathy and violence sensitivity for 
bystander and read article group. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 15. Scatterplot correlation between empathy and violence sensitivity for victim 
and video group.  
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Figure 16. Scatterplot Correlation Between Empathy and Violence Sensitivity for 
Victim and Read Article Group.  
 
There were only two significant correlations within the categories of empathy 
and violence sensitivity. The only group who showed significant correlation was the 
group of participants who were in victim perspective and read the article about the 
scenario. There was a moderate positive correlation between Empathetic Concern and 
V4, r(22) = .419, p = .033, with scores of empathetic concern explaining 18% of the 
variation in violence sensitivity for less severe nonphysical violent behaviors. There 
also was a moderate positive correlation between Perspective Taking and V3, r(23) = 
.384, p = .048, with scores of Perspective Taking explaining 15% of the variation in 
violence sensitivity for less severe physical violent behaviors. However, after 
adjusting for sex and social desirability these correlations were no longer statistically 
significant (r(20) = .356, p = .088; r(21) = .296, p = .151, respectively.) 
Partial correlations were performed controlling for sex and social desirability. 
All assumptions were met to perform a Pearson’s correlation. As can be seen in Table 
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9, there were no significant correlations between the empathy subscales (Empathetic 
Concern, Fantasy, Personal Distress, and Perspective taking) and the Violence 
Sensitivity categories (V1, V2, V3, V4, and VS Total) for any of the six groups based 
on the two independent variables (Perspective and Media: Perpetrator-Read, 
Perpetrator-Watched, Bystander- Read, Bystander-Watched, Victim-Read, Victim-
Watched). Results showed that after adjusting for sex and social desirability, the 
correlations between empathy and violence sensitivity remained not significantly 
different based on the perspective and media assigned to the participants.
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Table 9 
Correlations Between IRI Subscales and Violence Sensitivity Categories Per Group, 
Adjusted for Sex and Social Desirability  
 
 
Empathetic Concern Fantasy Perspective Taking Personal Distress
Perpetrator
Watched Video
V1 0.102 0.107 0.069 0.029
V2 0.146 -0.184 -0.062 0.191
V3 0.020 -0.083 -0.011 0.112
V4 0.159 -0.079 -0.053 0.212
VT 0.124 -0.118 -0.040 0.194
Read Article
V1 0.262 -0.265 0.241 0.126
V2 0.032 -0.066 -0.095 0.120
V3 0.089 0.038 0.123 0.249
V4 0.141 -0.003 0.118 0.113
VT 0.127 -0.018 0.091 0.194
Bystander
Watched Video
V1 0.237 0.148 0.083 0.021
V2 -0.014 -0.137 0.117 0.178
V3 0.110 0.176 -0.093 -0.008
V4 0.193 0.132 0.148 0.042
VT 0.124 0.094 0.123 -0.011
Read Article
V1 -0.058 -0.037 -0.082 0.116
V2 -0.168 -0.049 0.033 0.207
V3 0.059 -0.032 0.034 0.182
V4 0.046 0.000 0.089 0.177
VT -0.014 -0.032 0.049 0.217
Victim
Watched Video
V1 -0.063 0.131 -0.145 0.021
V2 0.216 0.151 0.053 0.116
V3 0.173 0.182 -0.019 0.227
V4 0.186 0.283 0.166 0.221
VT 0.193 0.239 0.061 0.214
Read Article
V1 -0.212 0.211 -0.005 0.177
V2 0.241 0.232 0.296 0.188
V3 0.073 -0.030 -0.094 0.372
V4 0.356 0.212 0.293 0.197
VT 0.231 0.164 0.179 0.273
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CHAPTER 4 
 
DISCUSSION 
 
 To gain a better understanding of different perspectives in the interpretation of 
a violent event was one of the purposes of the current research. Previous research has 
been done to understand the differences between the roles of the actors (Baumeister, 
1996; Baumeister, Stillwell, & Wotman, 1990; Kowalski, 2000; Stillwell & 
Baumeister, 1997), but not as much for the role of the observers (Jones & Nisbett, 
1972; Nadelhoffer & Feltz, 2008). Two different media methods were used to present 
information about the event, so that differences in word usage, empathy, and violence 
sensitivity could be analyzed, based on the difference in presentation, and 
perspectives. 
Previous research has suggested the importance of writing to promote better 
health (Pennebaker, 1993; Pennebaker, Mayne, & Francis, 1997), as well as the 
differences between words used by people of higher and lower status (Pennebaker, 
2011). People of different statuses and different perspectives use different words, 
specifically when it comes to their own experiences (Kowalski, 2000). Having a better 
and more complete understanding of the differences between the perspectives and the 
variations in the way the event is interpreted and understood could help reduce and 
prevent conflict. Though there is a basic understanding of the differences between 
victim and perpetrator word usage, there is a lack of research on the words bystanders 
use and how their word usage compares to the words used by actors (victims and 
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perpetrators). Having a better understanding of the words bystanders use could help 
understand how bystanders perceive conflict. This information can help shed light on 
bystander intervention programs. 
 The final focus of this research was to better understand the traits of empathy 
and violence sensitivity and how these traits reflect the perspectives and media to 
which participants were randomly assigned. In sum, the purpose of the present study 
was to learn more about the specific differences in interpretation and perception of the 
same event based on the perspective provided, and the media through which the event 
was presented. 
Summary of Results 
In the current research, it was hypothesized that participants would use certain 
categories of words based on the perspective to which they were assigned. Participants 
randomly assigned to the perpetrator perspective were expected to use words similar 
to those used by people in higher statuses, but results suggested that was not always 
the case. The categories analyzed included negative emotion, anger, and personal 
pronouns. Participants in the victim and perpetrator perspectives used words of 
negative emotion, and anger at similar rates, and participants in the bystander 
perspective used these word categories at lower rates. For the personal pronoun 
category, each group was significantly different from the other; bystanders used these 
words at a lower rate, followed by the victim perspective, and the perpetrator 
perspective used these words at the highest rates. 
The words used by the participants assigned to the victim perspective were 
expected to be consistent with words used by people in a lower-status position, as 
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suggested by Pennebaker (2011). The categories analyzed were first person singular 
pronouns, past focus, affective process, cognitive process, insight and causation. The 
category of first person pronouns did not reflect the anticipated results; instead 
participants in the perpetrator perspective used these words more than participants in 
the victim perspective, and bystanders used these words less than the other two 
perspectives. 
For the category of cognitive process, participants in the bystander perspective 
used these words at a higher rate than participants in the victim and perpetrator 
perspectives, with these two perspectives using them at a similar rate, and participants 
in the victim perspective using them at a lower rate (although not significantly). For 
the category of affective process, participants in the victim category used these words 
at higher rates than bystanders, however participants in the victim category used these 
words at a similar rate to participants in the perpetrator perspective. Results suggest 
that for affective process and cognitive process participants assigned to the bystander 
perspective used these words at different rates than participants in the victim and 
perpetrator perspective. Participants in the victim and perpetrator perspective used 
these word categories at similar rates. 
In the scenario presented to the participants, both perspectives learned about the 
same violent event. The victim got head-butted and as a result, the perpetrator got 
ejected from the soccer match. This might explain why there are not clear differences 
in the use of words between the victim and perpetrator perspective, and why for the 
most part these two perspectives used these words at similar rates. The perpetrators 
faced ejection from the match after his action, and the victim was physically hurt; both 
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perspectives had a negative experience in their own way. The assigned victim 
perspective might believe he is the “victim”, but the perpetrator perspective could feel 
that he is also the “victim” in this scenario. He might believe that he was provoked, 
and that being ejected from the game was an overreaction on the referee’s part. 
Another possible explanation for the lack of difference between participants in the 
victim and perpetrator perspectives could be because both perspectives experienced 
something negative, thus placing them on equal grounds. 
A pattern in the results showed that participants in the bystander perspective used 
words for the categories affective process, negative emotion and anger less than the 
other two perspectives. Participants in the bystander perspective used the words in the 
cognitive process word category more often than the other two perspectives. Because 
bystanders were retelling a story where they were the observers and not the actors, it is 
logical they would use first person pronouns, negative emotion and anger words less, 
as they were not in the position of experiencing something negative. 
This study also aimed to understand the participants’ responses and the words used 
based on the media by which the scenario was presented. The same categories were 
analyzed and there were no differences between the two groups for most of the word 
categories (third person singular, past, present, future focus, affective process, anger, 
cognitive process, insight, and causation), suggesting that regardless of the way in 
which the scenario was presented to participants, words were used at similar rates. 
However, results showed that word categories of all person pronouns, first person 
pronouns, and negative emotion were used at different rates. Participants who watched 
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the video used more words in all of these categories, than participants who read the 
article. 
With regard to empathy and violence sensitivity, hypotheses were not fully 
supported. The MANCOVA model that tested the outcome of empathy and controlled 
for social desirability and sex of the participants, did not suggest an interaction or 
main effect for media and perspective. Regardless of the perspective and the media, 
there was no difference in the scores of the participants on all four subscales of 
empathy. The MANCOVA model that tested the outcome of violence sensitivity did 
not suggest an interaction between media and perspective, or main effect for media 
and perspective either. Despite participant perspective and provided media, there was 
no difference in scores across all four categories of violence sensitivity. However, 
when separate ANCOVAS were performed controlling for the sex and social 
desirability, results suggested significant main effects for media and perspective. 
ANCOVAS were performed for each individual independent variable to better 
understand the four subscales of empathy. Results suggested that participants who 
read the news article scored higher in personal distress than participants who watched 
the video clip. Thus, participants who read the story felt more distress than participants 
who watched the video. Although results were not statistically significant, participants 
who read the news article scored higher in the other IRI subscales as well. This pattern 
shows that participants in this study might get more emotionally invested when they 
read, and perhaps are recreating the event in their minds. This result aligns with 
Johnson, Cushman, Borden, and McCune (2013), who suggest that individuals who 
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read create imagery, are more empathetic toward characters in the story, and are more 
likely to help, thus showing an increase in prosocial behaviors. 
The results of the ANCOVA analyzing violence sensitivity showed differences 
between perspectives for V1 and V2 (the physical violence categories). Participants 
assigned to the bystander perspective were less violence sensitive for V1 and V2, than 
the perpetrators and victims. However, for V3 and V4 (non-physical violence) there 
were significant differences for the media. Participants who read about the scenario 
were more violence sensitive to nonphysical behaviors. 
Results also showed a pattern, though a non-significant one, that participants 
assigned to the victim perspective were more violence sensitive than participants 
assigned to the bystander and perpetrator perspective. These results were similar for 
three of the four categories of violence severity (V2 - less severe physical, V3 - more 
severe nonphysical and V4 - less severe non-physical). There was no difference 
between the victim and perpetrator perspectives assigned for the V1 category (more 
severe physical); however participants in the bystander perspective were less violence 
sensitive to V1. This could be due to the severity of behaviors in this category. To 
further analyze violence sensitivity, the violence sensitivity total score was obtained. 
Similarly to previous results, participants who read the news article rated the violent 
behaviors as more severe than participants who watched the video, and participants in 
the bystander perspective rated the behaviors as less severe than participants in the 
other perspectives. 
Finally, the correlation between empathy and violence sensitivity was analyzed 
(controlling for social desirability and sex of participants). It was expected that a 
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positive correlation would exist between empathy and violence sensitivity. This 
hypothesis was supported upon finding a significant positive correlation between the 
empathy total and the violence sensitivity total. However, there were no significant 
correlations between the empathy total and the violence sensitivity total for any of the 
six groups. There were also no significant correlations between any of the IRI 
empathy subscales and violence sensitivity categories for any of the groups. A 
possible reason why results did not show differences between groups could be because 
of the small n size. 
Limitations 
The results obtained in this study were not as anticipated, nevertheless there were 
some unexpected significant results. However, these findings must be interpreted with 
the understanding of some specific limitations. One limitation of the study could have 
been the measures used, in particular the IRI (Davis, 1980) The factor analysis 
performed for the IRI, showed items that did not load as anticipated; for these 
analyses, the model by Davis (1980, 1983) was followed. The lack of a good fit in the 
model could also have had an effect on the results. The measures, specifically the 
Davis (1980) IRI, might not have been the most appropriate. 
Another possible limitation to this study could have been the story presented to the 
participants. Even though it was a violent event, it was not an exceedingly violent 
event. Participants who are used to seeing violence on TV shows are likely to have 
seen far worse violence than what was presented in this study. It is possible that 
participants are desensitized to this more mild type of violence. As mentioned before, 
the perpetrator in the scenario experienced a negative consequence for his actions, the 
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ejection from the game. This could have led some participants to perceive this as if 
they were the victims because they experienced some kind of injustice or suffering in 
the event. These participants may have seen themselves as equal to those in the victim 
perspective. The lack of a controlled environment for participants also served as a 
limitation. Because participants completed the survey at their convenience, they could 
have been primed to be less empathetic and less violence sensitive if for example, they 
were watching a violent TV show at the same time that they were completing the 
survey. Another limitation is the homogeneity of the participants. For the most part 
participants were female, Caucasian, Catholic and/or Christian. This does not allow 
much generalization to other populations.  
Future Directions 
 When analyzing the perspectives of victim and perpetrator, Kowalski (2000), 
Baumeister, Stillwell, and Wotman (1990), and Stillwell and Baumeister (1997) had 
the participants retell their own stories of their experiences when they were in the 
positions of victim and perpetrator. Future studies that analyze violence sensitivity and 
empathy could benefit from having the participants recall their own experiences for all 
three perspectives. A similar study could also be done in a laboratory setting; that way 
the environment of the participants could be more uniform. The lack of fit of the IRI 
could suggest that a revision of the Davis (1980) scale should be performed in the 
future, so that items could become more relevant to contemporary issues. 
 An exploratory analysis was performed to determine if the words used by 
bystanders were consistent with higher-status positions or lower-status positions. 
There is not much research on the words used by bystanders. Future studies could 
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emphasize researching the words that bystanders use, and research whether the words 
bystanders use could be indicative of action and intervention on their part. For 
example, are bystanders more likely to intervene in a conflict if they use words related 
to higher status? The bystander perspective could be expanded to further study 
bystander intervention. Having a better understanding of the bystander perspective 
could help with the development of interventions and conflict resolution programs. 
Conclusions 
By learning how different perspectives perceive a conflict, violence could 
potentially be reduced by limiting its escalation, by creating awareness in a situation 
and knowing how the other person in a conflict thinks and could act. In the case of the 
bystander, this person could intervene in a manner that is safe and be that ‘thirdsider’ 
that Ury (1999) referred. Here is when the understanding of the situation, and of the 
other person comes into play. In the case of an actor, to know how your opponent is 
possibly thinking can help in finding common ground, where both sides can reach a 
resolution.  
The results of this study did not suggest that the bystanders were more empathetic 
or violence sensitive than the actors (victims and perpetrators). This can be a future 
focus for interventions, to create more empathy and more understanding. Possibly, 
more empathy towards the actors and knowledge on how to safely intervene, would 
lead bystanders to help more. For the most part, victims and perpetrators were 
similarly empathetic and violence sensitive. Empathy could potentially help to avoid 
violence through understanding the perspective of the other person and trying to find a 
middle ground. Even though the results were not as expected, this research provides a 
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further understanding of the differences between perspectives, and the relationship 
between violence sensitivity and empathy. This knowledge can be applied to violence 
prevention efforts. 
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APPENDIX A 
 
News Article 
 
 At the 2006 World Cup Championship Game, Zinedine Zidane, the attacking 
midfielder of the French team, “rammed his head into the chest” (Moore, 2006) of the 
opposing Italian player, Marco Materazzi, in the final minutes of the World Cup 
championship game (Moore, 2006).  
 The game was broadcast on television, and it showed the incident. It all began 
when Materazzi a player from the Italian team, pulled Zidane’s jersey. After Materazzi 
lets go of Zidane’s jersey, both players exchanged some words. Zidane runs past 
Materazzi a few meters, while they keep exchanging words, and then runs back 
towards him and rams his head on his chest; making the Italian player, Materazzi, fall 
to the ground. Following the incident, the referee gave Zidane a red card, which got 
him sent off the match in the 110th minute of his last game before he retired (Moore, 
2006; Pugmire, 2006). 
 “Zidane had no compliments for Materazzi. "I know that my act is 
unforgivable," Zidane said in an interview. "I'm just saying that the real culprit should 
be punished. And the culprit is the one who provokes" (Moore, 2006). 
Video Clip 
Video Internet Link: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zAjWi663kXc 
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APPENDIX B 
 
Instructions 
 
 
Instructions for the News Article: 
Perpetrator Perspective 
 In order to complete study we ask that you separate a time block of thirty 
minutes to complete the study. 
Please take a moment to read the news article below, and imagine you are in the 
position or in the shoes of Zinedine Zidane.  
Please take a moment to recall and visualize the story you just read, and try to 
identify with Zinedine Zidane, before reading it once more. 
Finally, please take a moment to recall and visualize the story you just read before 
answering the following questions. While you recall the story you just read try to 
imagine how would you think and feel if you were in the position of Zinedine Zidane. 
Try to recall as many details as possible of the information presented; visualize how 
you would think, and feel, if you stood in the shoes of that person. 
Victim Perspective 
 In order to complete study we ask that you separate a time block of 
thirty minutes to complete the study. 
Please take a moment to read the news article below, and imagine you are in the 
position or in the shoes of Marco Materazzi.  
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Please take a moment to recall and visualize the story you just read, and try to 
identify with Marco Materazzi before reading it once more. 
Finally, please take a moment to recall and visualize the story you just read before 
answering the following questions. While you recall the story you just read try to 
imagine how would you think and feel if you were in the position of Marco Materazzi. 
Try to recall as many details as possible of the information presented; visualize how 
you would think, and feel, if you stood in the shoes of that person. 
Bystander Perspective 
 In order to complete study we ask that you separate a time block of 
thirty minutes to complete the study. 
Please take a moment to read the news article below, and imagine you are in the 
position or in the shoes of the person filming the video. 
Please take a moment to recall and visualize the story you just read, and try to 
identify with the person filming the video, before reading it once more. 
Finally, please take a moment to recall and visualize the story you just read before 
answering the following questions. While you recall the story you just read try to 
imagine how would you think and feel if you were in the position of the person 
filming the video. Try to recall as many details as possible of the information 
presented; visualize how you would think, and feel, if you stood in the shoes of that 
person  
Instructions for the Video Clip: 
Perpetrator Perspective 
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 In order to complete study we ask that you separate a time block of thirty 
minutes to complete the study. 
Please take a moment to watch the following video clip, and imagine you are in 
the position or in the shoes of the Zinedine Zidane (the player from the French team 
wearing the white jersey with the number 10).  
Please take a moment to recall and visualize the clip you just watched, and try to 
identify with Zinedine Zidane (the player from the French team wearing the white 
jersey with the number 10) before reading it once more. 
Finally, please take a moment to recall and visualize the clip you just watched 
before answering the following questions. While you recall the clip you just watched, 
try to imagine how would you think and feel if you were in the position of Zinedine 
Zidane (the player from the French team wearing the white jersey with the number 
10). Try to recall as many details as possible of the information presented; visualize 
how you would think, and feel, if you stood in the shoes of that person. 
Victim Perspective 
In order to complete study we ask that you separate a time block of thirty minutes 
to complete the study. 
Please take a moment to watch the following video clip, and imagine you are in 
the position or in the shoes of Marco Materazzi (the player from the Italian team 
wearing the blue jersey with the number 23).  
Please take a moment to recall and visualize the clip you just watched, and try to 
identify with Marco Materazzi (the player from the Italian team wearing the blue 
jersey with the number 23) before reading it once more. 
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Finally, please take a moment to recall and visualize the clip you just watched 
before answering the following questions. While you recall the clip you just watched, 
try to imagine how would you think and feel if you were in the position of Marco 
Materazzi (the player from the Italian team wearing the blue jersey with the number 
23). Try to recall as many details as possible of the information presented; visualize 
how you would think, and feel, if you stood in the shoes of that person. 
Bystander Perspective  
In order to complete study we ask that you separate a time block of thirty minutes 
to complete the study. 
Please take a moment to watch the following video clip, and imagine you are in 
the position or in the shoes of the person filming the video. 
Please take a moment to recall and visualize the clip you just watched, and try to 
identify with the person filming the video before reading it once more. 
Finally, please take a moment to recall and visualize the clip you just watched 
before answering the following questions. While you recall the clip you just watched, 
try to imagine how would you think and feel if you were in the position of the person 
filming the video. Try to recall as many details as possible of the information 
presented; visualize how you would think, and feel, if you stood in the shoes of that 
person. 
Instruments/ Questionnaire 
I. Demographics 
1. Age 
2. Gender 
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3. Race 
4. Major 
5. Religion 
6. Do you play contact/competitive sports (i.e., football, soccer, basketball, 
rugby, lacrosse, boxing, hockey, etc.)? 
7. Political Affiliation 
II. Questions about the video watched/ news article read:  
1. What events led to the fight? (All Perspectives) 
2. What did the other player said or did that was hurtful to you? (Victim and 
Perpetrator Perspectives) 
3. What did Zinedine Zidane (the French player who headbutted the other player) 
say or do that was hurtful? (Bystander Perspective)  
4. What did Marco Materazzi (the Italian player who was headbutted) say or do 
that was hurtful? (Bystander Perspective) 
5. Please describe your thoughts and feelings just prior to the event. (Please be as 
thorough as possible and use complete sentences.) (All Perspectives) 
6. Please describe your thoughts and feelings at the moment of the event. (Please 
be as thorough as possible and use complete sentences.) (All Perspectives) 
7. Please describe your thoughts and feelings after the event. (Please be as 
thorough as possible and use complete sentences.) (All Perspectives) 
8. Do you expect any disciplinary actions to take place for the person you were in 
the "shoes of"? (Victim and Perpetrator Perspectives)  
a. What are some of the consequences you expect will take place?  
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b. Please explain why not.  
9. Do you expect any disciplinary action to take place for the other person 
involved in the incident? (Victim and Perpetrator Perspectives)  
a. What are some of the consequences you expect will take place?  
b. Please explain why not.  
10. Do you expect any disciplinary action to take place for Zinedine Zidane (the 
French player who headbutted the other player)? (Bystander Perspective)  
a. What are some of the consequences you expect will take place?  
b. Please explain why not.  
11. Do you expect any disciplinary action to take place for Marco Materazzi (the 
Italian player who was headbutted)? (Bystander Perspective) 
a. What are some of the consequences you expect will take place?  
b. Please explain why not. 
III. Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI) (Davis, 1980) 
On a scale from 1(does not describe me) to 5 (describes me), please rate the following 
statements 
1. I daydream and fantasize, with some regularity, about things that might happen 
to me. 
2. I often have tender, concerned feelings for people less fortunate than me. 
3. I sometimes find it difficult to see things from the “other guy’s” point of view.  
4. Sometimes I don’t feel sorry for other people when they are having problems.  
5. I really get involved with the feelings of the characters in a novel. 
6. In emergency situations, I feel apprehensive and ill-at-ease. 
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7. I am usually objective when I watch a movie or play, and I don’t often get 
completely caught up in it.  
8. I try to look at everybody’s side of a disagreement before I make a decision. 
9. When I see someone being taken advantage of, I feel kind of protective toward 
them. 
10. I sometimes feel helpless when I am in the middle of a very emotional 
situation. 
11. I sometimes try to understand my friends better by imagining how things look 
from their perspective. 
12. Becoming extremely involved in a good book or movie is somewhat rare for 
me. 
13. When I see someone get hurt, I tend to remain calm.  
14. Other people’s misfortunes do not usually disturb me a great deal.  
15. If I’m sure I’m right about something, I don’t waste much time listening to 
other people’s arguments.  
16. After seeing a play or movie, I have felt as though I were one of the characters. 
17. Being in a tense emotional situation scares me. 
18. When I see someone being treated unfairly, I sometimes don’t feel very much 
pity for them.  
19. I am usually pretty effective in dealing with emergency.  
20. I am often quite touched by things that I see happen. 
21. I believe that there are two sides to every question and try to look at them both. 
22. I would describe myself as a pretty soft-hearted person. 
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23. When I watch a good movie, I can very easily put myself in the place of a 
leading character. 
24. I tend to lose control during emergencies. 
25. When I’m upset at someone, I usually try to “put myself in his shoes” for a 
while. 
26. When I am reading an interesting story or novel, I imagine how I would feel if 
the events in the story were happening to me. 
27. When I see someone who badly needs help in an emergency, I go to pieces. 
28. Before criticizing somebody, I try to imagine how I would feel if I were in 
their place. 
IV. Adopting perspectives 
On a scale from 1(strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree), please rate the following 
statements as they apply to you.  
1. It was very difficult for me to adopt the instructed perspective. 
2. I did not have any difficulty adopting the instructed perspective. 
3. It was very easy for me to adopt the instructed perspective. 
V.  Violence Sensitivity Scale (Collyer et al., 2007) 
On a scale from 1(not violent at all) to 7 (extremely violent), please rate the following 
behaviors. 
1. The incident you just learnt about. 
2. Pushing 
3. Murder 
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4. Shooting 
5. Stealing 
6. Slapping 
7. Cursing 
8. Kidnapping 
9. Vandalism 
10. Sabotage 
11. Stabbing 
12. Gossip 
13. Rudeness 
14. Manipulation 
15. Fighting 
16. Hitting 
17. Screaming  
VI. Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability Scale (Reynolds, 1982) 
On a scale from 1(strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree), please rate the following 
statements as they apply to you: 
1. It is sometimes hard for me to go on with my work if I am not encouraged.  
2. I often times feel resentful when I don’t get my way. 
3. On a few occasions, I have given up doing something because I though too 
little of my ability. 
4. There have been times when I felt like rebelling against people in authority 
even though I knew they were right. 
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5. No matter who I’m talking to, I’m always a good listener. 
6. There have been occasions when I took advantage of someone. 
7. I’m always willing to admit when I make a mistake. 
8. I sometimes try to get even rather than forgive and forget. 
9. I am always courteous, even to people who are disagreeable. 
10. I have never been irked when people expressed ideas very different from my 
own. 
11. There have been times when I was quite jealous of the good fortune of others. 
12. I am sometimes irritated by people who ask favors of me. 
13.  I have never deliberately said something that hurt someone’s feelings. 
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APPENDIX C 
 
 
 
Figure 1A. PCA Screeplot of the IRI  
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Table 1A 
 
Patterns of Structure Matrix for PCA with Oblimin Rotation of Five-Factor Solutions 
of Empathy (IRI) Item 
 
  Pattern coefficient 
Item # Component 1  Component 2 Component 3 Component 4 Component 5 
25 0.767 
28 0.721 
8 0.684 
21 0.682 
11 0.639 
3 0.439 0.386 
15 0.391 0.304 0.305 
24 0.792 
19 0.763 
6 0.707 
27 0.701 
17 0.606 -0.366 
14 0.743 
18 0.702 
13 0.387 0.605 
12 0.509 -0.506 
7 0.486 -0.471 
4 0.356 0.479 
22 0.302 0.355 
16 -0.815 
5 -0.75 
23 -0.736 
26 -0.731 
1 -0.626 
9 -0.615 
10 0.309 -0.544 
2 0.325 0.367 -0.480 
20       -0.302 -0.361 
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Table 1A 
  
Patterns of Structure Matrix for PCA with Oblimin Rotation of Five-Factor Solutions 
of Empathy (IRI) Item (Continuation) 
 
  Structure Coefficient Communalities 
Item # Component 1 Component 2 Component 3 Component 4 Component 5   
25 0.733 0.599 
28 0.725 0.548 
8 0.685 0.498 
21 0.725 -0.340 0.563 
11 0.688 0.546 
3 0.450 0.448 0.470 
15 0.405 0.385 0.358 
24 0.805 0.674 
19 0.700 0.624 
6 0.735 0.566 
27 0.716 0.570 
17 0.678 -0.463 0.589 
14 0.753 0.574 
18 0.694 0.576 
13 0.390 0.535 0.531 
12 0.571 -0.485 0.635 
7 0.517 -0.458 0.518 
4 0.385 0.528 0.430 
22 0.387 0.325 0.413 -0.339 0.451 
16 -0.796 0.672 
5 -0.761 0.582 
23 -0.768 0.617 
26 -0.761 0.605 
1 -0.675 0.484 
9 0.326 -0.615 0.479 
10 0.426 -0.600 0.473 
2 0.468 0.413 -0.520 0.568 
20 0.416   0.361 -0.452 -0.458 0.534 
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Table 2A 
Patterns of Structure Matrix for PCA with Oblimin Rotation of Four-Factor Solutions of Empathy (IRI) Item 
 
  Pattern Coefficient Structure Coefficient Communalities 
Item 
# 
Component 
1 
Component 
2 
Component 
3 
Component 
4 
Component 
1 
Component 
2 
Component 
3 
Component 
4   
28 0.731 0.726 0.530 
25 0.697 0.690 0.485 
11 0.696 0.724 0.544 
8 0.694 0.677 0.485 
21 0.693 0.707 0.558 
2 0.498 0.335 0.571 0.402 0.474 
9 0.456 0.489 0.265 
20 0.395 -0.326 0.504 0.349 -0.469 0.507 
24 0.761 0.769 0.620 
17 0.750 0.753 0.568 
6 0.728 0.737 0.550 
27 0.656 0.684 0.502 
19 0.650 0.598 0.485 
10 0.530 0.564 0.351 
1 0.328 0.334 0.364 0.394 0.314 
14 0.741 0.748 0.567 
18 0.676 0.687 0.496 
13 0.491 0.558 0.430 0.492 0.516 
4 0.549 0.560 0.367 
12 0.541 -0.493 0.583 -0.466 0.614 
7 0.485 -0.478 0.509 -0.455 0.517 
3 0.316 0.465 0.321 0.496 0.434 
15 0.393 0.431 0.256 
22 0.329 0.374 0.395 0.358 0.412 -0.331 0.446 
16 -0.797 -0.785 0.644 
5 -0.749 -0.759 0.579 
23 -0.734 -0.767 0.615 
26       -0.733       -0.763 0.604 
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